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Note
Internet Filters and the First Amendment: Public
Libraries After United States v. American Library
Association
Leah Wardak*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2003, two grandparents took their grandson to the
public library in a suburb of Chicago.' As the nine-year-old boy was
using the library's computer, which was located in a children's section,
he was able to access pornographic files that had been saved to the
computer by a previous user. 2 The library responded to the
grandparents' complaint by turning off the computers until it could
formulate an appropriate response to library patrons accessing
inappropriate materials. 3 This library, like many others, has struggled
to find ways to protect children from accessing inappropriate materials
4
on the Internet.
Over the last decade the Internet 5 has become a tool used by more
than 143 million Americans, providing quick and easy access to
* J.D. expected May 2005. To my family and friends, especially my mother and my late
father, for their unwavering love and unconditional support-this Article would not have been
possible without your encouragement. I would also like to express my gratitude for the extremely
hard-working and dedicated staff of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal, especially.
Robyn Axberg, Gia Font6, and Ryan Haas.
1. Joseph Sjostrom, Oak Park Library Turns Off Computers; Sexual Images Seen in

Children'sArea, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2003, at 10, availableat 2003 WL 68334794.
2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id.; see infra Part H.D.I-2 (describing filtering software and its alternatives).
5. For a definition of the "Internet" and a discussion of its history, see Susan J. Drucker &
Gary Gumpert, Legal Geography: The Borders of Cyberlaw Introduction, in REAL LAW @
VIRTUAL SPACE: COMMUNICATION REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE 3 (Susan J. Drucker & Gary
Gumpert eds., 1999). The Internet may be separated into two subcategories: the "publicly-

indexable Web," which is more easily accessible, and the "Deep Web," which contains materials
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information from around the world. 6 Individuals who do not have
access to the World Wide Web (the "Web") 7 at home must go

elsewhere, including their local public library, to gain access. 8 Indeed,
9

ten percent of Americans who use the Internet do so at public libraries.
While the Internet provides access to much valuable information, it
also contains a vast amount of pornographic material. 10 Children, who
constitute a large number of Internet users,11 often access the Internet in
that potential viewers must seek out more actively. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201
F. Supp. 2d 401, 418-19 (E.D. Pa. 2002) [hereinafter ALA I] (discussing the differences between
these two types of Internet materials), rev'd, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003).
6. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 405, 422; see Drucker & Gumpert, supra note 5, at 3 (stating that
the number of Internet users is growing at a rate that is difficult to keep current). Because the
Web is a world-wide medium, there are difficulties in dealing with jurisdictional issues. Drucker
& Gumpert, supra note 5, at 7-15 (discussing some issues pertaining to jurisdiction when dealing
with a world-wide medium, such as the Internet). Some commentators argue that "cyberspace
[should] be considered a 'place,' rather than a medium, with its own constitution on which to base
a developing body of applicable law and self-regulatory systems." Id. at 16.
7. See Drucker & Gumpert, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the Web and its history).
The Web refers to the thousands of host computers and servers interconnected through
the Internet featuring graphical sites called "home pages," which feature graphics,
hypertext markup or highlighted text, and "hot links" that interlock sites globally,
allowing one to browse or "surf' many sites. Web browsers operating on a "point and
click" basis have fueled the enormous growth of the Internet. The Web allows for the
display of text, images, sound, and video. Commercial online services such as
America Online (AOL), CompuServe, and Prodigy provide content and organization
and now incorporate Web browsers.
Id.

8. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 422; Internet Free Expression Alliance, Joint Statement for the
Record on "Kids and the Internet: The Promise and the Perils" (Dec. 14, 1998), available at
http://www.eff.org/Censorship/Censorware/19981214_ifea-nclis.statement (last visited Mar. 15,
2004). Approximately 95% of public libraries in the United States have Internet access available.
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2301 (2003) [hereinafter ALA II].
9. ALA 1,201 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
10. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2301; see also ALA 1,201 F. Supp. 2d at 406 ("There are more than
100,000 pornographic websites that can be accessed for free and without providing any
registration information, and tens of thousands of Web sites contain child pornography."). But
see Mitchell P. Goldstein, Congress and the Courts Battle over the First Amendment: Can the
Law Really Protect Childrenfrom Pornographyon the Internet?, 21 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 141, 144-45 (2003) (stating that commercial adult websites make up just over 2.1% of

the total number of websites).
11. Minors constitute a large number of Internet users, with approximately seventy-five
percent of fourteen- to seventeen-year-olds and sixty-five percent of ten- to thirteen-year-olds
using online services. NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, A NATION ONLINE: How AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR USE OF

THE INTERNET, (Feb. 2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/html/execsum.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2004). An increasing number of children access the Internet to work on

school projects, research items of interest, or connect with others through e-mail or chat sessions.
See SAMUEL JOSHUA FRIEDMAN, CHILDREN AND THE WORLD WIDE WEB: TOOL OR TRAP? 8
(2000) (reporting that, in 1997, close to one million children were using the Web and at least 3.8
million had access, and forecasting that the number of children using and accessing the Web
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places with no parental supervision, such as schools, libraries, and
friends' homes. 12 Easy access to sexually explicit materials has created
problems for libraries, which report that patrons of all ages use library
computers to view online pornography. 13 Additionally, some libraries
report that patrons leave pornographic materials on the monitors or even
in the printers. 14 Due to the increasing number of younger Internet
users and the vast amount of pornography available on the Internet,
Congress has grappled with ways to protect children from these harmful
materials. 15

would quadruple every four years). See generally Goldstein, supra note 10, at 142-43
(discussing general uses of the Internet and number of users).
12. COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., REPORT TO CONGRESS 14 (Oct. 20, 2000), available
at http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004). See
generally Gretchen Witte, Comment, Internet Indecency and Impressionable Minds, 44 VILL. L.
REV. 745, 757-70 (1999) (discussing some of the negative effects of children's access to online
pornography). One commentator recognized that children's viewing of pornography has some
detrimental effects, such as desensitizing children to the severity of sexual violence, teaching
children to view women negatively, contributing to children's premature sexual development, and
allowing children to be more accessible to sexual predators. Id. at 764-70. Conversely, this
commentator also argued that there are some benefits of allowing children access to sexually
explicit materials, such as to teach children the proper names for body parts. Id. at 771
13. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2301; DAVID BURT, FAMILY RESEARCH COUNCIL, DANGEROUS
ACCESS, 2000 EDITION: UNCOVERING INTERNET PORNOGRAPHY IN AMERICA'S LIBRARIES
(2000) (discussing numerous instances where patrons or librarians reported that other patrons
used
the
library computer
terminals
to
access
pornography),
available at
http://www.copacommission.org/papers/bi063.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004). But see Gregory
K. Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment Implications of the Use of
Software Filters To Control Access to Internet Pornographyin Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L.
REV. 213, 236 (2003) (discussing a study finding that in the preceding one-year period, less than
twenty percent of libraries received any formal complaints about Internet content).
14. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2301-02; BURT, supra note 13, at 6-11 (describing incidents of
patrons using library computers to access and even print pornographic images).
15. See infra Part II.D.3.a (discussing the Communications Decency Act of 1996); infra Part
II.D.3.b (discussing the Child Online Protection Act); infra Part ILI.A (discussing the Children's
Internet Protection Act); see also COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12 (reviewing
different proposals for regulating children's access to the Internet). The Commission on Online
Child Protection report includes analysis of the following:
[Fliltering and blocking services; labeling and rating systems; age verification efforts;
the possibility of a new top-level domain for harmful to minors material; "greenspaces"
containing only child-appropriate materials; Internet monitoring and time-limiting
technologies; acceptable use policies and family contracts; online resources providing
access to protective technologies and methods; and options for increased prosecution
against illegal online material.
Id. at 14. The Commission on Online Child Protection conducted its study on the proposed
protective methods with the focus on use in homes or other private environments. Id. at 15.
Also, whereas the Child Online Protection Act applied only to Web materials, the commission
looked at other contexts, including e-mail, chat rooms, instant messaging, and newsgroups. Id.
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In United States v. American Library Ass'n, 16 the Supreme Court
addressed the latest congressional attempt to curb children's access to
the Internet: the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"). 17 The
Supreme Court held that CIPA, which requires public libraries to use
Internet filtering software to block inappropriate material, did not
18
violate the United States Constitution.

Before examining the Court's decision in United States v. American
Library Ass'n, Part II of this Note will address First Amendment
principles of content-based and content-neutral restrictions on speech,
the right to receive information, and the lack of protection for certain
types of sexually explicit materials. 19 Part II then will discuss various
attempts to protect children from inappropriate materials on the
Internet. 20 Next, Part II will address Spending Clause jurisprudence and
2 1 Part III
congressional power to attach conditions to federal funding.
will examine the district court and the Supreme Court decisions
regarding the constitutionality of CIPA. 22 Part IV will analyze the
Supreme Court decision and argue that the plurality applied the
incorrect level of scrutiny when it found CIPA to be constitutional.2 3
Finally, Part V will discuss the impact of the Supreme Court's finding
that CIPA was constitutional.2 4

16. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297 (2003).
17. Although CIPA is a federal statute, some states have enacted legislation to deal with
children's access to inappropriate Internet materials. See Amy Keane, Annotation, Validity of
State Statutes and Administrative Regulations Regulating Internet Communications Under
Commerce Clause and FirstAmendment of Federal Constitution,98 A.L.R. 5TH 167, § 3b (2003)

(listing state statues that have attempted to address children's Internet access).
18. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2309. In addition to libraries, schools receiving specified federal
funds also must comply with CIPA provisions. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1)(B) (2003). However,
this Note will only address CIPA in the library context.
19. See infra Part II.A (discussing the distinction between content-neutral and content-based
restrictions on speech and the requisite levels of constitutional scrutiny); infra Part 11.B
(discussing the First Amendment right to receive information); infra Part II.C (discussing the lack
of First Amendment protection for certain sexually explicit material).
20. See infra Part II.D (discussing some options for libraries and recent legislative attempts to
protect children from accessing Internet pornography).
21. See infra Part II.E (discussing standards applied to the use of the Spending Clause to
regulate activities).
22. See infra Part III (discussing the rationale of the district court decision and the reasoning
of the Supreme Court when it reversed the district court opinion by finding CIPA constitutional).
23. See infra Part IV.A. (discussing the dissent's correct application of strict scrutiny, in
contrast with the plurality's application of rational basis review).
24. See infra Part V. (discussing how the Supreme Court's decision impacts local libraries).
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II. BACKGROUND
This Part begins with an analysis of the First Amendment's
distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions on
speech and public forum designations. 25 This Part then examines the
right to receive information guaranteed under the First Amendment and
how it applies to libraries and the Internet.26 Next, this Part addresses
the First Amendment's lack of protection for obscene material, child
pornography, and material that is "harmful to minors." 27 This Part then

examines methods for restricting minors' access to inappropriate
material on the Internet, including filtering software and legislative
efforts. 28 Finally, this Part addresses Congress's powers under 29the
Spending Clause and its use of those powers to regulate the Internet.
A. The FirstAmendment DistinctionBetween Content-neutraland
Content-based Regulations
The First Amendment provides, in part, that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech."3 ° Contrary to its specific
language, this amendment does not prohibit all restrictions on speech;

25. See infra Part II.A.1-2 (discussing speech restrictions based on content, including their
regulation in different public forums, and the requisite levels of scrutiny).
26. See infra Part II.B. 1-2 (discussing the First Amendment right to receive information and
how courts have interpreted this doctrine in the contexts of libraries and the Internet).
27. See infra Part II.C. 1-3 (discussing the rationale supporting the Supreme Court's decisions,
where the Court determined that the First Amendment does not protect obscenity, child
pornography, and materials that are "harmful to minors").
28. See infra Part II.D. 1-2 (discussing filtering software and other library-based alternatives,
as well as statutes that have attempted to deal with the problem of children accessing
inappropriate materials on library computers).
29. See infra Part .E (discussing the powers that the Constitution confers on Congress and
how these powers are supplemented by the Spending Clause).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the
Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of
public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
Speech, it is said, is divided into three sorts-(l) speech that everyone has a right to
(political speech, speech about public affairs); (2) speech that no one has a right to
(obscene speech, child porn); and (3) speech that some have a right to but others do not
(in the United States, Ginsberg speech, or speech that is 'harmful to minors,' to which
adults have a right but kids do not).
Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model,
98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 395 (1999). "The history of the law of free expression is one of
vindication in cases involving speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even
ugly." United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000). See generally DANIEL
A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-13 (1998) (discussing the history behind the enactment of
the First Amendment); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
957-59 (14th ed. 2001) (outlining the history behind the First Amendment).
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instead, the First Amendment prohibits only the suppression of speech

that is based on content. 31 Therefore, the government may not restrict
speech because it disagrees with the message, ideas, subject matter, or
substance of that speech.3 2 Additionally, the government may not
justify its restrictions on speech solely on content. 33 Consequently,
when the government attempts to regulate speech, the regulation's
constitutionality depends on whether it is linked to the content of the
34
speech.

31. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (plurality opinion) ("As a general
matter, 'the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983))).
32. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
To permit the continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure selffulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any
thought, free from government censorship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is
content control. Any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would
completely undercut the "profound national commitment to the principal that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
Id. at 95-96 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). See generally
Laughlin, supra note 13, at 221-34 (outlining the history of censorship and particularly the
history of censorship in American libraries); Christopher D. Hunter, Filtering the Future?:
Software Filters, Porn, Pies and the Internet Content Conundrum 11-20 (n.d.) (outlining the
general history of censorship), available at http://www.copacommission.org/papers/hUnterthesis.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
33. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, Chicago enacted an
ordinance that prohibited picketers from demonstrating directly before, during, or directly after
school hours. Id. at 92-93. The defendant had picketed outside of a local high school, claiming
that the school discriminated against African-Americans. Id. at 93. Because the ordinance
allowed some types of picketing (such as for labor disputes) rather than others, the Court applied
an Equal Protection analysis after finding that the ordinance constituted a content-based
restriction on speech. Id. at 94-95. The Supreme Court went further than just issuing a finding
of viewpoint discrimination by announcing a broad rule: "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." Id. at 95.
34. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) ("We have long held, for
example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not
because of the ideas it expresses .... ). In R.A. V., the city of St. Paul enacted an ordinance that
made criminal any act where the speaker "knows or has reasonable grounds to know" that the act
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender." Id. at 380. Communications that were not related to one of the protected categories
were permissible, even if quite severe or hostile. Id. The state argued that these communications
were construed to mean "fighting words," which previously had been ruled as not privileged for
First Amendment protection. Id. The majority of the Supreme Court viewed the ordinance as a
content-based regulation that was not narrowly tailored to the city's compelling interest. Id. at
395-96.
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1. Distinction Between Content-neutral and

Content-based Regulations
To determine if a regulation is content-neutral or content-based, the
main question is whether the government instituted the regulation
because it disagreed with the content of the message it aimed to
suppress. 35 In making this determination, the government's intent is the
focus of the inquiry. 3 6 If a restriction is content-based, then the
regulation may stand only if it meets a heightened level of judicial
scrutiny; however, if the restriction37is content-neutral, courts will not
apply a heightened level of scrutiny.
Indeed, if a regulation's purposes are content-neutral, the regulation
does not violate the First Amendment, even if it incidentally restricts
protected speech. 38 For a regulation to be content-neutral, the Supreme
Court announced in United States v. O'Brien that it must: (1) not
reference the content of the materials, (2) be "narrowly tailored" 39 to the
significant government interest in question, and (3) leave ample room
for alternative methods of receiving the regulated speech. 40 Therefore,
35. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). In Ward, a sponsor of a music
concert at the Central Park bandshell sued New York City, claiming a First Amendment violation
for an ordinance that required the use of city sound technicians. Id. at 784. The plaintiff, Rock
Against Racism ("RAR"), a group that advocated against racist views, held an annual event at the
bandshell for which it supplied its own sound technicians. Id. at 784-85. RAR had received
warnings that the sound exceeded the allowed limits, after which its power was cut off, which in
turn lead to an unruly and hostile reaction from the attendees. Id. at 785.
36. Id. at 791.
37. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (stating that there
is a presumption of a constitutional violation when the government enacts a content-based
restriction, but that the regulation may stand if it meets strict scrutiny). However, for examples of
using a lower level of scrutiny, see Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185
(1997), which addressed speech-related restrictions in the broadcasting and cable television
arenas, and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1969), which addressed
speech-related restrictions in radio and television broadcasting.
38. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
39. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). A restriction is narrowly tailored
when it is no greater than necessary to further the government's interest. Id.
40. Id. In Unites States v. O'Brien, the defendant burned his draft card in protest of the
Vietnam War. Id. at 369. The Supreme Court upheld the ban on burning draft cards because the
cards provided the means to check one's draft status. Id. at 378-80. The Court found the ban on
burning draft cards to be content-neutral, because its restriction on speech was no more restrictive
than necessary to further a significant government interest. Id. at 381-82. Chief Justice Warren
announced the following test for content-neutrality:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
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for a regulation to be content-neutral, the restriction on speech must be
narrowly tailored, so as to be no greater than is necessary to further the
41
government's interest.
The Supreme Court later clarified the O'Brien three-factor test,
holding that a regulation may be content-neutral even if it does not
employ the least restrictive option. 42 Consequently, a restriction is
content-neutral if it reasonably relates to a significant government
interest, other than the suppression of speech because of its content, and
is narrowly tailored to a significant government interest, even though it
43
need not be the least restrictive alternative.
Regulations based on the content of speech presumptively violate the
First Amendment.4 4 Thus, a restriction may remain in effect only if the
content-based restriction withstands strict scrutiny, a heightened level of
review. 45 To withstand strict scrutiny, the restriction on protected
speech must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government
interest. 46 Courts apply a two-step inquiry for strict scrutiny: (1)
whether there is a compelling government interest involved, and (2)

where there is a compelling government interest, whether the restriction
is narrowly tailored to the government interest. 47 If there is a less

41. Id. Under the Equal Protection Clause, statutes that affect one's First Amendment rights
must be narrowly tailored to the government's objectives. Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 101 (1972). The Fourteenth and First Amendments are intertwined because "the crucial
question is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered by the
differential treatment" of different types of speech. Id. at 95; see also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340
U.S. 268, 272 (1951) (discussing the intersection of the First Amendment and Equal Protection).
42. Ward, 491 U.S. at 789-90; see O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (outlining the three-factor test).
43. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-803. The Supreme Court stated:
[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored
to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information."
Id. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
44. City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
45. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Sable Communications
of Cal. Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). Rational basis review is a lower threshold
standard, in which the challenged practice need only be reasonable, the government interest in
question need not be compelling, the restriction need not be narrowly tailored to the government
interest, and the practice need not be the most reasonable or even the only reasonable practice.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 808-09 (1985); see Goldstein,
supra note 10, at 142 (stating that "regulations based on the time, place or manner of speechcontent-neutral regulations---only need some rational basis to survive constitutional scrutiny
under the First Amendment").
46. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
47. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
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restrictive alternative that would meet the needs of48 the government's
interest, the legislature must employ that alternative.
2. Public Forum Analysis

Because

content-based

restrictions

are

presumptively

unconstitutional, the government generally may not restrict speakers
from accessing government property for speech purposes if the
regulation is content-based. 49 However, the type of public forum does

affect the level of scrutiny the regulation must withstand. 50 The
Supreme Court has recognized three types of forums: (1) traditional

48. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 ("The Government may... regulate the
content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a compelling [government]
interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest."); see also
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637 (1980) (stating that
legislatures must use "narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms" when trying to regulate a fundamental
right); ROBERT S. PECK, LIBRARIES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CYBERSPACE: WHAT YOU
NEED To KNOw 12 (2000) ("Where less drastic means are available to achieve the same basic
purpose, even if the result would be less complete from the viewpoint of the government's
asserted interest, that less restrictive alternative must be utilized.").
In Playboy, the Supreme Court examined restrictions placed on television channels that have
sexually oriented programming. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806. Under the Telecommunications Act
of 1996, cable television stations that primarily provided sexually oriented programming were
required to fully scramble the pictures, or otherwise fully block the images or limit the
transmission to times when children likely would not view the channels. Id. The Supreme Court
in Playboy ruled that the statute in question imposed a content-based regulation, since it applied
solely to sexually oriented materials, thereby subjecting it to strict scrutiny. Id. at 811-12. The
Court stated, "[The statute] 'focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that
speech has on its listeners.' ... This is the essence of content-based regulation." Id. (citation
omitted). The Court further reasoned that, although the government's interest in protecting
children from viewing sexually oriented materials was compelling, this interest was not
compelling enough to support a "blanket ban" on materials if there was a less restrictive
alternative. Id. at 814. "Where the designed benefit of a content-based speech restriction is to
shield the sensibilities of listeners, the general rule is that the right of expression prevails, even
where no less restrictive alternative exists. We are expected to protect our own sensibilities
,simply by averting [our] eyes."' Id. at 813 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
49. PECK, supra note 48, at 13-14.
50. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that "the First Amendment
affords greater deference to restrictions on speech in those areas considered less amenable to free
expression," such as military bases or airport terminals, than to state universities, public parks, or
sidewalks). Although the forum's designation generally determines the level of scrutiny for
content-based restrictions, the restriction may still be proper if it is a reasonable regulation of
"time, place, or manner." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989). In Ward, the
Supreme Court held that the ordinances, which required that musicians use city sound equipment
and city sound technicians, were permissible, because they were based on the government's
interest in noise control. Id. at 802. The Court reasoned that for a regulation to be a time, place,
and manner restriction, it did not need to involve the least restrictive option for meeting the
government interest. Id. at 797-98. Rather, the government must show that the alternatives
would not be as effective as the one implemented. Id. at 799.
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forums.
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non-public

First, a traditional public forum is an area that individuals and groups
historically have used for public discussion and expression and that
requires no official government designation. 52 For example, public
areas such as sidewalks, streets, and parks are traditional public
forums. 5 3 Traditional public forums are subject to strict scrutiny;
consequently, the government may exclude a speaker from a traditional

public forum only when the exclusion serves a compelling
government
54
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.

Second, a designated public forum is an area that was not
traditionally open to public discussion; instead, the government took an
affirmative step to make the area available as a place for public
discussion. 55 To determine whether the government has created a
designated public forum, courts will look to whether the government
intended to designate an area as a public forum. 56 Some examples of
designated public forums include school board meetings, 57 state
university facilities, 5 8 and municipal theaters. 5 9 Similar to traditional
public forums, courts apply strict scrutiny to the government's
60
exclusion of a speaker from a designated public forum.
Third, non-public forums, which are made up of properties not
deemed traditional or designated public forums, are areas that
traditionally have not been open for public expression and have not
been designated a public forum by the government. 6 1
Speech

51. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
52. Ark. Educ. Television Conm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) ("Traditional public
fora are defined by the objective characteristics of the property, such as whether, 'by long
tradition or by government fiat,' the property has been 'devoted to assembly and debate."' (citing
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45)); see Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
680-81 (1992) (rejecting the attempt to broaden the traditional public forum from its historical
roots).
53. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 454-55.
54. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.
55. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 ("The government does not create a
[designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by
intentionally opening a nontraditional [public] forum for public discourse.").
56. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
57. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167,
175 (1976).
58. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981).
59. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
60. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998).
61. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 673, 679 (1992).
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restrictions in non-public forums are still subject to review, but only
under a reasonableness test. 62 The general difference between a
designated public forum and a non-public forum is that a designated

public forum provides "general access," while a non-public forum
provides only "selective access," primarily for federal employees. 6 3 For
example, military bases, 64 airport terminals, 6 5 and the federal
workplace 66 are non-public forums and not designated public forums
because they generally are reserved for federal employees. 67 Nonpublic forums are subject to a rational relation review; therefore, the

government may restrict speakers so long as the restrictions are
reasonable and do not attempt to stifle a speaker's views solely because
68
public officials dislike those particular views.
Because the forum's classification directly affects the level of
scrutiny that courts utilize when examining content-based regulations,
determining the forum at issue in the regulation is key. 69 Courts

ascertain which type of public forum is at issue by examining the
specific access the speaker seeks, not the location of the government

62. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-78; ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2002). An airport
terminal is an example of a non-public forum. Lee, 505 U.S. at 678.
63. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S.
788, 803-05) (1985). "By recognizing this distinction, we encourage the government to open its
property to some expressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it
might not open the property at all." Id. at 680.
64. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-39 (1976).
65. Lee, 505 U.S. at 682.
66. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805 (1985). In Cornelius,
the NAACP attempted to participate in the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), a charity drive
that targeted federal employees. Id. at 790, 793. Organizations that wished to participate
submitted a thirty-word description of their activities for inclusion in CFC literature. Id. at 79091. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education fund, along with other plaintiffs, participated in
attempts to influence public policy, such as advocating, lobbying, and participating in litigation.
Id. at 793. The plaintiffs challenged the CFC's "direct services" requirement, arguing that this
requirement violated the First and Fifth Amendments. Id. The district court ruled against the
plaintiffs, which lead to President Reagan's issuance of an Executive Order that clarified the
CFC's objectives. Id. at 794. The NAACP filed another suit, and the Supreme Court decided
whether the petitioners had a First Amendment right to solicit contributions under the CFC. Id. at
797.
67. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 460 (explaining that with public forums, the government is
creating an environment for the expression of private speech).
68. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. "Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely
to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government
property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by
the speaker's activities." Id. at 799-800.
69. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983)
(examining which system-the whole school system or the school's internal mail system-was
the appropriate context for public forum analysis).
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property. 70 For example, in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, the Supreme Court addressed the local educators'

union's right to use the public school's internal mail system to reach
teachers' mailboxes. 7 1 The Court found that the relevant forum was not
the public school itself, but the school's internal mail system. 72 Only

after the Court determined what forum was at issue in the case could it
73
classify the forum and determine the requisite level of scrutiny.
To determine the level of scrutiny necessary to analyze government

restrictions on Internet access in public libraries, courts first must
determine the relevant forum.74 Courts have found that libraries create
designated public forums because the government has taken affirmative
steps to make the library facilities Open for public access to
information. 75 Therefore, when the government provides Internet
access within a public library, it creates a designated public forum,
76
thereby subjecting it to strict scrutiny.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
Although... as an initial matter a speaker must seek access to public property or to
private property dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns, forum
analysis is not completed merely by identifying the government property at issue.
Rather, in defining the forum [the Supreme Court has] focused on the access sought by
the speaker. When speakers seek general access to public property, the forum
encompasses that property. In cases in which limited access is sought, our cases have
taken a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a forum within the
confines of the government property.
Id. (citations omitted).
71. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44.
72. Id. at 46. The Court reasoned that there was no evidence that the school's internal mail
system was generally open to the public. Id. at 47. The Court noted that although schools allow
some civic and church organizations to use the school's facilities, "[t]his type of selective access
does not transform government property into a public forum." Id.
73. Id. at 41. However, in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police of Morristown, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified the public forum analysis for libraries,
stating that courts must consider three factors: (1) government intent, (2) extent of the forum's
use, and (3) nature of the forum. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242,
1259-61 (3d Cir. 1992). At issue in Kreimer was the library's policy that (1) required individuals
who were not "reading, studying, or using library materials" to leave the library facility; (2)
prohibited patrons from engaging in harassing or annoying behavior; and (3) required patrons
"whose bodily hygiene is offensive so as to constitute a nuisance to other persons" to leave the
library. Id. at 1262-64. After applying the factors it set forth, the Kreimer court found that the
local public library was a limited public forum, which the court stated was "a sub-category of
designated public fora." Id. at 1261; see also Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun
County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562-63 (E.D. Va. 1998) (applying the Kreimer three-factor
analysis to a library, finding that the county board created a designated public forum, thus
subjecting its use of Internet filters to strict scrutiny).
74. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 455 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
75. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1261; Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
76. See Mainstream Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63 (ruling that the public library's
system was a designated public forum). In Mainstream Loudoun, the court stated that the library
70.
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B. The First Amendment Right To Receive Information

The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment creates
an implicit right to receive information because without this ancillary
rule, freedom of speech would have no real meaning. 77 The right to
receive information directly flows from the right of an individual to
send information. 7 8 Consequently, the right to receive is a necessary
predicate for the meaningful exercise of the recipients' First
Amendment freedoms. 79 This section first focuses on the relationship
between the right to receive information and public libraries.8 0 Next,
81
this section discusses the right to receive in relation to the Internet.
1. Right To Receive and Libraries
In Board of Education v. Pico, the Supreme Court considered the
right to receive information in the context of children's access to
information in libraries. 82 At issue in Pico was the local school board's
decision to remove certain objectionable books from the school
district's libraries. 83 The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion written
by Justice Brennan, held that once a library makes an article available,

content-based decisions to remove it must survive strict scrutiny. 84 The

board passed a resolution providing that the library's "primary objective... [is] that the people
have access to all avenues of ideas." Id. at 563. "Because the Policy at issue limits the receipt
and communication of information through the Internet based on the content of that information,
it is subject to strict scrutiny analysis .
I..."
Id.
77. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
564 (1969). See generally Susan Nevelow Mart, The Right To Receive Information, 95 LAW
LIBR. J. 175, 175 (2003) (discussing how the right to receive information has evolved and
asserting that it is a necessary part of the right of free speech).
78. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) ("The right of freedom of speech and
press ... embraces the right to distribute literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive
it." (citation omitted)).
79. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67 (1982) (plurality opinion).
80. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the role of libraries in an individual's right to receive
information).
81. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how the advent of the Internet has affected individuals'
First Amendment right to receive information).
82. Pico, 457 U.S. at 855-56 (plurality opinion). See generally Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd.
of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792 (E.D. Va. 1998) (discussing the
implications of the Pico decision).
83. Id. at 856-57. The School Board argued that it removed books that were "anti-American,
anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy." Id. at 857; see also id. at 856 n.3 (listing the
titles and authors of the nine books that were removed from the school library).
84. Id. at 870-71; see also Mainstream Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 796 ("[Iln this case, the
Library Board need not offer Internet access, but, having chosen to provide it, must operate the
service within the confines of the First Amendment."). Although the Court in Pico did not issue a
majority opinion, the justices affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that
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Court explained that, although school districts have discretion over
managing school matters, this discretion must comply with
constitutional mandates. 85 Therefore, because the First Amendment
decisions to
protects individuals' rights to receive information, libraries'
86
remove materials must comport with strict scrutiny.
2. Right To Receive and the Internet
In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County
Library, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia ruled that the First Amendment right to receive information
applied to the Internet, after it examined the use of filtering technology
in a local library. 87 The plaintiffs in Mainstream Loudoun argued that
the Internet was an integrated system and, therefore, was different from
a library's collection of print materials.8 8 The plaintiffs also argued that
the library board's decision to block certain websites was analogous to
89
library staff blacking out inappropriate sections of print materials.
The court agreed with the plaintiffs' contentions, stating that because
the library board chose to provide Internet access, it could not

the case should be remanded to the district court to determine the library's motive for removing
the materials. Pico, 457 U.S. at 853 (plurality opinion).
85. Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969) (holding that the school board had infringed on students' First
Amendment rights by suspending them for wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam War); W.
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that a student could not be forced
to salute the flag).
86. Pico, 457 U.S. at 875 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
87. Mainstream Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792. Loudoun County chose not to appeal the
district court's judgment. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 184. For a general discussion of the
Mainstream Loudoun case, including its history and disposition, see Goldstein, supra note 10, at
180-84. See generally Laughlin, supra note 13, at 215-16 n.9 (discussing generally Loudoun
County's Internet filtering policy); J. Adam Skaggs, Burning the Libraryto Roast the Pig? Online
Pornographyand Internet Filtering in the Free Public Library, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 809, 835-38
(2003) (stating that the Mainstream Loudoun case was the backdrop for a CIPA challenge); David
F. Norden, Note, Filtering Out Protection: The Law, the Library, and Our Legacies, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 767, 780-83 (2003) (stating that the Mainstream Loudoun case set the stage for
CIPA). But see Kim Houghton, Note, Internet Pornography in the Library: Can the Public
Library Employer Be Liable for Third-party Sexual Harassment When a Client Displays Internet
Pornography to Staff?, 65 BROOK. L. REv. 827, 874-81 (1999) (stating that the Mainstream
Loudoun court applied the wrong law, because it should have considered the library's use of
Internet filters to address the secondary effects of accessing inappropriate materials, such as
sexual harassment).
88. Mainstream Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
89. Id.; see Laughlin, supra note 13, at 262 ("[T]ext-based filters are not a tool for aiding
librarians in making professional judgments, but rather are a blunt instrument used to avoid the
work of collection development.").
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90
selectively restrict Internet materials when it did not like the content.
Moreover, the district court found that the policy was not narrowly
tailored to the interest the library board was trying to serve. 9 1 In sum,
the district court held that the use of Internet filters failed to pass strict
scrutiny .92

C. The FirstAmendment's Lack of Protectionfor Obscenity
and Child Pornography
Although the First Amendment generally protects freedom of speech,
some types of speech receive no protection. 93 Specifically, the First
Amendment does not protect obscenity, child pornography, or materials
94
that are otherwise "harmful to minors."
1. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Obscenity
In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment does not protect obscene speech and established a test to
determine whether speech constitutes obscenity. 95 Specifically, the
Court stated that to determine if speech is obscene, courts must examine
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
96
to prurient interest."
In a subsequent case, Miller v. California, the Court announced a
more refined test for determining what type of material was considered

90. Mainstream Loudoun, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 795-96; see also id. at 796 ("[Iln this case, the

Library Board need not offer Internet access, but, having chosen to provide it, must operate the
service within the confines of the First Amendment.").
91.
92.

Id. at 795.
Id.

93. FARBER, supra note 30, at 14-15.
94. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-66 (1982) (ruling that child pornography is not
protected under the First Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 (1957) (ruling
that obscenity was not protected material); see also Goldstein, supra note 10, at 146-55
(describing the evolution of obscenity law, which includes addressing the different standards for
adults versus minors, and child pornography).
95. Roth, 354 U.S. at 481, 489-90. Roth sent unsolicited advertisements through the mail to
get new customers for his business. Id. at 480. He was convicted of mailing obscene materials,
in violation of federal obscenity law, after an unsuspecting recipient of Roth's materials opened
the advertisements. Id.
96. Id. at 489. The Supreme Court reasoned that obscenity is not the same as sex. Id. at 487.
"The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to
deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press." Id. Rather,
obscenity applies to materials that appeal to a prurient interest, which means that they have "a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Id. at 488 & n.20 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 101 (1940)).
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"obscene." 97 This refined test for obscenity asks whether: (1) "the
average person applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest"; (2)
the material "depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law"; and (3) "the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
98
scientific value."
Since Miller, courts have grappled with applying contemporary
community standards to nationwide media, such as telecommunications
or the Internet. 9 9 However, in Sable Communications of California v.
FCC, the Supreme Court clarified the proper application of
contemporary community standards to nationwide media. 10 0 The Court
held that Congress was not precluded from enacting legislation that
prohibits acts that would be subject to varying community standards
simply because there exists no national standard for obscenity.' 0 ' The

Miller was convicted of knowingly
97. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
distributing obscene materials, which he did not believe were obscene, after he sent some of his
brochures through an unsolicited mass mailing to a recipient in another community who was
offended by their content and complained to the police. Id. at 16-17.
98. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24; see also United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 710-11 (6th Cir.
1996) (applying the Miller test in the Internet context). The Court in Miller declined to include
the standard of whether the materials were "utterly without redeeming social value." Miller, 413
U.S. at 24-25. See generally A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966) (discussing the utterly without redeeming
social value standard).
99. See Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1989) (applying
contemporary community standards to a "dial-a porn" business, arguing that Sable could tailor its
messages to the communities from which its messages are originated); Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 41821 (applying the contemporary community standards to a book distributed to many locations);
Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709-10 (ruling that, although the defendants ran their website from
California, because their materials were received in Tennessee, the Tennessee standard applied);
COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 13 ("Material published on the Internet may
originate anywhere, presenting challenges to the application of the law of any single
jurisdiction."); Goldstein, supra note 10, at 156 (stating that "[p]orn[ography] vendors in more
liberal jurisdictions have been prosecuted if they have knowingly or intentionally distributed
obscenity into conservative jurisdictions").
100. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124-26.
101. Id. at 125.
There is no constitutional barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are
obscene in some communities under local standards even though they are not obscene
in others. If Sable's audience is comprised of different communities with different
local standards, Sable ultimately bears the burden of complying with the prohibition on
obscene messages.
Id. at 125-26. Further, the Court explained that businesses are free to tailor their messages to the
communities they choose to serve. Id. at 125. The Court further reasoned that a message
provider may hire operators to determine from where the calls originated or work with the
telephone company to screen and block out-of-area phone calls. Id. However, this would create
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Court explained that it included a "community standard" factor into the
obscenity test so that the average person's perception would guide the
decision, rather than the perception of a particularly sensitive
individual. 10 2 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that if a speaker only
wants her materials judged by one particular community, then the
speaker should use a medium that would enable her to target that

community, rather than a medium such as the Internet, where the3
10
speaker's materials can be accessed from almost any geographic area.
Therefore, website operators may be at risk of obscenity charges if their
materials are accessed from or are sent to communities that have stricter
10 4
obscenity standards than their own.
2. The First Amendment Does Not Protect Child Pornography
Like obscenity, the First Amendment does not protect child
pornography. 10 5 In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court held that
child pornography was illegal and not subject to First Amendment
protection. 10 6 In Ferber, the defendant ran a store that specialized in

another cost for the message provider. See id. (holding that being forced to incur implementation
costs is not prohibited by the Constitution).
102. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 575 (2002) (plurality opinion); Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
103. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 583 (plurality opinion); see Sable, 492 U.S. at 125 (stating
that interstate "dial-a-porn" companies could tailor their messages to particular communities).
For example, in United States v. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit clarified the government's evidentiary
burden as it pertained to the Internet by stating that, although the government must show that the
defendants knowingly used a means of interstate commerce to distribute their obscene materials,
the government did not need to show that the defendants had specific knowledge of the
destination of each transmission over their website. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 709
(6th Cir. 1996).
104. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709. In United States v. Thomas, the defendant and his wife were
charged under the federal obscenity statute after materials ordered from their website, which was
based in California, were shipped by United Parcel Service to Tennessee. Id. at 705. The Sixth
Circuit Federal Court of Appeals rejected the defendants' argument that they did not cause their
materials to be accessed from another state; rather, the defendants argued that the customer, who
was actually a government agent, accessed their website without the defendants' knowledge,
causing the defendants to enter Tennessee. Id. at 709. Here, the defendants challenged the venue
of their trial in Tennessee when their residence and website were based in California. Id. The
Court upheld the Tennessee venue, emphasizing that "there is no constitutional impediment to the
government's power to prosecute pornography dealers in any district into which the material is
sent." Id.
105. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765-66 (1982).
106. Id. at 765-66.
The Miller formulation is adjusted in the following respects: A trier of fact need not
find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average person; it is not
required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a patently offensive manner; and
the material at issue need not be considered as a whole.
Id. at 764.
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adult materials. 107 Due to an increasing number of incidents regarding
the sexual exploitation of children, many states enacted laws prohibiting

the creation and dissemination of pornography involving minors. 108

The Supreme Court found that child pornography and the sexual abuse

of children were "intrinsically related" because (1) the pornographic
materials were a permanent record of the child's abuse, and (2) the
materials were distributed through a closed network so as to protect the
offenders. 10 9 Also, the Court reasoned that the production of child
pornography was an integral part of an already illegal activity-child
sexual abuse. 1 0 Consequently, one need not apply the Miller obscenity

test to determine whether the First Amendment protects an article of
child pornography because, as the Supreme Court held, the First
Amendment does not protect child pornography. 11
3.

Different Standards for Adults Versus Children

In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment provides different standards of protection to speech, with
adults receiving more First Amendment protections than children. 112 In
Ginsberg, a shopkeeper was convicted of selling sexually explicit
magazines to a minor. 113 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
noting that the states have increased authority over regulating children's
conduct and are allowed to restrict certain freedoms for children that
otherwise are protected for adults. 114 The Court explained that creating
107. Id. at 751-52. He was convicted of disseminating child pornography after he sold two
videotapes that depicted two young boys engaged in sexual activity to an undercover police
officer. Id. at 752.
108. Id. at 757. "The prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a
government objective of surpassing importance." Id.; see also id. at 749 n.2 (describing
numerous state laws attempting to combat child pornography). The Supreme Court recognized
the compelling state interest not only in protecting children from nonobscene material that is
harmful to minors, but also in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor." Id. at 756-57. The Court distinguished purely textual depictions from the depictions of
child pornography in Ferber. Id. at 765.
109. Id. at759-60&nn.10-11.
110. Id. at 761-62. The Court also stated that unprotected materials are limited to those
involving photographs, live performance, or other depictions of live performance involving
children. Id. at 765.
111. See id. at 765 (stating that production and distribution of child pornography are not
afforded First Amendment protection).
112. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968) ("[T]he concept of obscenity or of
unprotected matter may vary according to the group to whom the questionable material is directed
or from whom it is quarantined.").
113. Id. at 631.
114. Id. at 638-39; see, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding
the conviction of two guardians for violating Massachusetts' child labor laws by allowing their
nine-year-old child to sell Jehovah's Witness materials on the streets). In Prince, although there
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an additional standard for non-obscene materials that are "harmful to
minors" was warranted because there are some materials 115
that, while

appropriate for adults to access, are inappropriate for minors.

Later, the Supreme Court established a three-factor test to determine
whether the government should be afforded additional discretion when
applying restrictions to children in areas constitutionally protected for
adults. 116 First, courts may look to children's particular vulnerabilities
in the area suggested for regulation. 1 17 Second, courts may consider a
child's ability, or inability, to make informed decisions.1 l 8 Third,9
courts may afford deference to the role parents play in child-rearing."1
Thus, the Supreme Court created two levels of First Amendment
analysis, one for examining materials that are constitutionally protected
for everyone, including minors, and one for20examining materials that

are only constitutionally protected for adults.1

D. Means of ProtectingAgainst ChildrenAccessing Inappropriate
Materialson the Internet
Because the Internet contains a large quantity of objectionable
content, libraries and legislators have experimented with different ways
of regulating access to obscenity, child pornography, and materials

was a question of religious freedom, the state had an interest in protecting the child's well-being.
Id.
115. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 ("Because of the State's exigent interest in preventing
distribution to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health,
safety, welfare and morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books
recognized to be suitable for adults."). To decide whether an article is "harmful to minors," one
would apply the Miller obscenity test as it relates to minors. PECK, supra note 48, at 51-52.
Thus, the first element [of the Miller obscenity test] requires that the material must
appeal to the prurient interest of minors. The second provides a legislature with
somewhat more leeway to specify the kind of sexual conduct depicted or described that
would be patently offensive for minors. These statutes are often called "harmful-tominor" laws, which is a synonym for "obscene for minors." Finally, the last element
must be evaluated in light of whether, taken as a whole, the work lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. That value for minors must be
examined in light of whether the material holds serious value for "any reasonable
minor, including a seventeen-year-old." If it does, then it cannot be restricted as
harmful to minors.
Id. (citations omitted).
116. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). The Bellotti Court reasoned that some
groups of people are treated differently due to their particular vulnerabilities. Id. at 634.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636.
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This section first addresses the use of

filtering software, such as how the software works and how it
overblocks constitutionally protected materials and underblocks the

materials it is meant to protect against. 122 Next, this section examines
alternatives to filtering software. 123 Finally, this section addresses
previous legislative efforts to regulate children's access to sexually
124
explicit materials on the Internet.
1. Filtering Software
To protect against patrons or employees accessing inappropriate
materials, many organizations have installed and used Internet filtering
126
software 125 to block objectionable content from computer terminals.
Internet filters may be installed either on individual computers or on a
network, the latter commonly being used by public libraries. 127 When a
request for a website is made by clicking on a link or typing in a domain
name or Web address, the filtering software checks the requested
address against a "control list," which contains categories of Universal
128
Resource Locators ("URLs") to be blocked.

121. See COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 14-32 (discussing the
numerous methods of dealing with children accessing inappropriate materials on the Internet).
122. See infra Part II.D.I (discussing the manner in which filtering software functions and its
limitations).
123. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing proposed alternatives to using filtering software on
library computers).
124. See infra Part II.D.3 (discussing two congressional attempts to regulate children's access
to objectionable online materials).
125. "A content filter is one or more pieces of software that work together to prevent users
from viewing material found on the Internet." HARRY HOCHHEISER, FILTERING FAQ § 1.1, at
http://www.cpsr.org/filters/faq.htm (Apr. 6, 2001).
126. Geoffrey Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farce, AM. PROSPECT ONLINE, at
http://www.prospect.org/print/vl2/l/nunberg-g.html (Jan. 1, 2001).
127. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 428 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The network-based filtering software
is meant to be installed on a network of computers and uses a "centralized network device" to run
requests for Internet materials. Id. The network-based program is the most widely used type of
filtering software in public libraries because it operates on multiple terminals. Id.; see THE
INTERNET FILTER ASSESSMENT PROJECT, FILTER PRODUCTS, at http://bluehighways.coml
tifap/products.html (last updated Sept. 28, 1999) [hereinafter TIFAP] (containing a list of
different filtering software programs, the websites for their respective manufacturing companies,
and general information about their performance).
128. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 428. The district court stated that the three software companies
that were deposed for this case in connection with ALA I had control lists that contained between
200,000 and 600,000 URLs. Id. at 427-28. Of the software companies that design filtering
software, SurfControl reported that it used forty categories; N2H2 reported that it used thirty-five
categories, along with seven "exception" categories; and Websense and Secure Computing both
used thirty categories. Id. at 428-29 (listing as well the numerous categories available for
blocking through the respective filtering software programs). Much of the filtering software
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There are two main ways that filtering software programs block

content. 129 First, some software companies use a text-based approach,
which uses keywords in the control list to block websites that contain
those words. 130 This method, however, is problematic because the
13 1
software blocks out any websites that contain the specified words.
For example, if either "breast" or "sex" is on the control list, the
filtering software will block information on breast cancer and safe
sex. 132 Additionally, the text-based filters do not recognize visual

may allow for some objectionable content to sneak
depictions, which 133

through the filters.
The second method of categorizing inappropriate materials involves
1 34
using individuals to analyze websites and categorize their content;
however, this method also has proven problematic. 13 5 Due to the
enormous amount of Web materials, software companies are unable to
review every website even one time, let alone re-review the content of
websites that frequently are updated or modified. 136 Also, using
humans to review and categorize the content of websites leaves room
judgments that may not match the needs of
for subjective, value-based
137
the software customer.
A user may customize the filtering software either by selecting which
categories to block and which to allow, or by adding or removing
programs focus on Web content; therefore, the filters will not block information found in such
Internet-based functions as e-mail or newsgroups. HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 1.5.
129. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 430-36 (describing methods of reviewing websites and
categorizing them); HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 2.5 (describing the keyword approach to
filtering software).
130. HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 2.5. Using keyword searches, the filtering software is
unable to interpret the context in which the word is being used. Id.
131. See Nunberg, supra note 126 (stating that overblocking is an "inevitable consequence" of
the keyword approach).
132. J.M. Balkin et al., Filtering the Internet: A Best Practices Model 10 (Sept. 15, 1999),
available at http://www.copacommission.org/papers/yale-isp.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
133. HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 2.5. "Keyword searches cannot interpret graphics. It is
not currently possible to 'search' the contents of a picture. Therefore, a page containing sexually
explicit pictures will be blocked only if the text on that page contains one or more words from the
list of words to be blocked." Id.
134. See Balkin et al., supra note 132, at 10 ("Evaluators generate lists of acceptable and
unacceptable sites; software either restricts access to the unacceptable sites ('blacklisting') or
allows access to only the acceptable ones ('whitelisting').").
135. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (describing the methods and
limitations used by software companies).
136. See id. at 433 (stating that there are approximately 1.5 million new Web pages each day
and that software companies do not have enough staff to review this volume of websites).
137. See id. ("None of the filtering companies trains its reviewers in the legal definitions
concerning what is obscene, child pornography, or harmful to minors, and none instructs
reviewers to take community standards into account when making categorization decisions.").
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Although filtering

software users may customize the software or even disable the filters,
problems exist when the software incorrectly blocks information. 139 In
fact, many studies have indicated that filtering software overblocks
constitutionally protected materials while also underblocking materials
140
that the filtering software was meant to block.
2. Alternatives to Filtering Software
To avoid problems associated with the use of Internet filtering

software,

many

libraries

have

experimented

with

numerous

138. Id. at 429. The categories also did not include reference to community standards or
judicial involvement in making the category determinations. Id. Only the companies that design
the filtering software have access to the complete list of URLs in each category. Id. at 429-30.
The district court in ALA I found it problematic that none of the categories used by the filtering
software designers were identical to the categories that CIPA required to be blocked. Id. at 429.
Since these lists are considered proprietary, the software companies do not make the lists
available for public review. Id. at 430.
Companies compile these lists in two phases. Id. First, they collect or "harvest" relevant URLs
from the Web. Id. at 431-32. Next, they sort through the collected URLs in order to classify the
websites into the software's categories. Id. at 432-35. After the websites are placed into
categories, most software companies do not revisit the website to check whether the content has
changed and may need to be placed into another category or even unblocked. Id. at 435-36.
"Priority is placed on reviewing and categorizing new sites or pages, rather than on re-reviewing
already categorized sites and pages.
Typically, a filtering software vendor's previous
categorization of a Web site is not re-reviewed for accuracy when new pages are added to the
Web site." Id. at 435.
139. See HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 1.3 (stating that filtering software can be turned off
by the user, but that the systems may be subject to hackers who could "guess the password or
disable the program by other means"); Nunberg, supra note 126 (stating that filtering software
companies have a "natural interest in drawing the circle very broadly, so as to block sites that
might be objectionable to one or another segment of their market, even if they wouldn't be
considered pornographic or offensive by any reasonable standard").
140. See generally COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 19-22 (describing the
problems with using filtering software); ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., INTERNET BLOCKING &
CENSORWARE, WHY BLOCKING TECHNOLOGY CAN'T WORK, at http://www.eff.org/
Censorship/Censorware (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (listing ten reasons why filtering technology
does
not
work);
KAREN
G.
SCHNEIDER,
LEARNING
FROM
TIFAP,
at
http://www.bluehighways.com/tifap/learn.html (Sept. 13, 1997) (documenting the findings from a
study performed by volunteer librarians on filtering software programs that found that the
filtering software, over thirty-five percent of the time, blocked information that the librarian
needed to answer patron questions); JONATHAN ZITRAIN & BENJAMIN EDELMAN,
DOCUMENTATION OF INTERNET FILTERING WORLDWIDE, at http://www.cyber.law.harvard.edu/
filtering/ (last updated Oct. 24, 2003) (summarizing numerous studies on filtering software that
have been conducted around the world); Hunter, supra note 32, at 69-91 (applying "social
science methods" to examine filter effectiveness); Christopher D. Hunter, Internet Filter
Effectiveness: Testing Over and Underinclusive Blocking Decisions of Four Popular Filters 1013 (n.d.) (finding that, after performing a study on four software programs, the best-performing
program only blocked sixty-nine percent of objectionable material), available at
http://www.copacommision.org/papers/filter-effect.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
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alternatives. 14 1 Some of these alternatives are proactive, while others
are reactive. 14 2 For example, libraries have attempted to prevent
patrons' access to inappropriate materials by implementing Internet use
policies, which outline acceptable uses for the libraries' computer
143
terminals as well as consequences for not following the guidelines.
Alternatively, libraries have educated library patrons on Internet
resources and appropriate uses 144 and have compiled lists of
recommended websites, which the librarians have reviewed and deemed
45
appropriate for their patrons. 1
In addition, libraries have physically placed Internet terminals away
from the main areas of the library to protect against patrons' inadvertent
exposure to objectionable materials. 14 6 Conversely, some libraries have
moved Intemet terminals to areas that may be viewed easily by
librarians, so that they can monitor the patrons' searches and intervene

141. See Laughlin, supra note 13, at 269-72 (discussing some of the methods used by libraries
to protect against patrons accessing Internet pornography and concluding ultimately that holding
individuals responsible is the paramount approach, which may be done in conjunction with other
methods). For a discussion of the Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS") option, which
may work in conjunction with Internet filters, see Norden, supra note 87, at 777-78 (describing
the manner in which PICS operates and its relation to filtering software). PICS was developed as
an alternative to filtering software because, rather than blocking what is distributed, it enables
users to control what they receive. HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 3.1.
142. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 423-27 (outlining the many methods libraries use to
protect against patrons viewing inappropriate materials).
143. Id. at 425; see COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 36 (outlining the
implications of implementing acceptable use policies, which patrons sign to acknowledge their
agreement to use a library's computers for appropriate uses). The American Library Association
has issued some guidelines for libraries to consider when implementing an Internet use policy.
See AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, GUIDELINES AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR DEVELOPING A PUBLIC
LIBRARY INTERNET USE POLICY (Nov. 2000), available at
http://www.ala.org/
Template.cfm?Section=OtherPolicies andGuidelines&Template=/ContentManagement/Conten
tDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=13098 (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, GUIDELINES
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING USER BEHAVIOR AND
LIBRARY USAGE (Nov.
17,
2000), available at http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm
?Section=OtherPolicies and Guidelines&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentlD=13147 (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES, REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
AFFECTING ACCESS TO LIBRARY MATERIALS, SERVICES AND FACILITIES (June 28, 1994),
available
at
http://www.ala.org/Template.cfm?Section=Other Policies-andGuidelines&
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=13141
(last visited Mar. 16,
2004).
144. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (describing training used to channel patrons' use of the
Internet); see also COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 18 (describing the
effectiveness of educating parents and families on Internet resources).
145. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 424-25.
146. See id. at 425-26.
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if patrons access obscenity or child pornography. 147 If library patrons
access inappropriate materials, librarians also have used the "tap-on-theshoulder" method and will ask the patrons either to go to a new website
or to discontinue their Internet session. 14 8 Some libraries have even
created special areas where children have computer terminals
designated for Internet access. 149 In lieu of monitoring the computer
screens, some libraries use privacy screens1 50 or recessed monitors1 51 so
that patrons may access the Internet without fear of exposing others to
potentially objectionable materials. 152 Finally, libraries could require
some type of parental involvement. 153 This would entail educating
parents and their children about the Internet, requiring parental consent
to use unfiltered computers, having parents designate a filtering level
when a child applies for a library card, or only allowing children to use
154

the Internet when their parents can monitor its use.

147. Id.; see COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 34-35 (describing the
issues around libraries' use of monitoring and time-limiting practices). But see Nunberg, supra
note 126 (arguing that monitoring Internet use may inhibit young people from using library
computers to access information on sensitive topics, such as safer sex, sexual orientation, or
suicide).
148. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 424. With the "tap-on-the-shoulder" method, librarians may
tap on the patron's shoulder, requesting him or her to change websites, or, if the patron refuses to
comply, ask the patron to terminate his or her session. Id. at 425-26. However, this method
makes some librarians uncomfortable-not only with the sexual content on the patron's screen
but also with the idea of confrontation. Id. at 426.
149. Id. at 425.
150. When using a privacy screen, the computer's monitor appears blank unless one is looking
at it head-on. Id.
151. A recessed monitor is a screen that sits below the level of the desktop on which the
computer is located. Id.
152. Id. Yet, some have complained that these methods create difficulties when more than
one person is using the computer. Id. This method also proves difficult when a librarian is trying
to assist a patron with Internet searches, because both the patron and the librarian will not be able
to view the monitor at the same time. Id.
153. See Kelly Rodden, Note, The Children's Internet ProtectionAct in Public Schools: The
Government Stepping on Parents' Toes?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2141, 2156-61 (2003)
(discussing whether CIPA infringes on parents' right to control what information their children
receive).
Parents may claim that they, not the government, should be making decisions about the
material to which their children are exposed. The Internet is a vast resource, and
parents may want their children to have access to information about sexuality, human
anatomy, and other similar topics that potentially would be blocked by filtering
technology. Some individuals feel these are sensitive topics, and therefore it is
important to maintain meaningful choices for parents in this realm, and avoid risking
overly burdensome state influence on [children's] beliefs and values.
Id. at 2160.
154. See id. at 2161 ("CIPA's opponents may argue that deferring to parental regulation
avoids broader constitutional problems, such as First Amendment concerns, that arise when the
federal government attempts to regulate speech."). But see Witte, supra note 12, at 779 (arguing
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Some libraries have chosen to use a combination of the above
methods, because each library has different needs and constraints, such
as the lack of financial resources or limited physical space.' 5 5 This
allows libraries to tailor their proposed solutions to their specific
156
community and circumstances.
3. Congressional Attempts To Control Children's Access to
Online Pornography
The government has not placed on public libraries the entire burden
of restricting minors from obscenity, child pornography, and other
materials that are "harmful to minors." 157 Instead, recognizing the
government's strong public interest in protecting children from such
159
inappropriate speech on the Internet, 15 8 Congress enacted legislation.
that Internet filters may be appropriate when used privately by parents to tailor their children's
restricted access to the Internet). By allowing parents to choose the level of access for their
children, parents can tailor filtering software to the specific concerns for each child. Id. For
example, a parent may be more concerned about violence than sexually explicit materials. Id.
155. See COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 17-38 (discussing the
effectiveness of the many proposed methods to control children's access to inappropriate
materials).
156. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 425-26 (discussing the various methods used by different
libraries that allow the libraries to address their unique settings and circumstances).
157. See infra Part II.D.3 (discussing Congress's attempts to regulate children's access to
inappropriate Internet materials).
158. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2310 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The interest in
protecting young library users from material inappropriate for minors is legitimate, and even
compelling, as all Members of the Court appear to agree."); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869
(1997) ("We agreed that 'there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and
psychological well-being of minors' which extended to shielding them from indecent messages
that are not obscene by adult standards." (quoting Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115, 126 (1989))); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) ("The ease with which
children may obtain access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in
Ginsberg, amply justify special treatment of indecent broadcasting."); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) ("This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in
prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination
carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of
exposure to juveniles."); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("The world of
children is not strictly part of the adult realm of free expression. The factor of immaturity, and
perhaps other considerations, impose different rules."); Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, ALA 11
(No. 02-361) (arguing that the protection from obscenity, child pornography, and materials that
are harmful to minors is a compelling interest), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/02-361.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). For a report
discussing incidents where children accessed pornographic materials at public libraries, see
BURT, supra note 13, at 6-11. This Family Research Council report was based on an analysis of
Freedom of Information Act requests to public libraries for incident reports. Id. at 1. There were
reports of children accessing pornographic websites and even masturbating while viewing the
websites. Id. at 6-11. There was even a reported incident in which the police of one locality had
to be contacted after a teenager was goaded by a person with whom he was chatting online into
approaching a younger child for sexual acts. Id. at 9.
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Communications Decency Act

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") was Congress's

160
first attempt to regulate children's access to Internet pornography.

As enacted, the CDA prohibited (1) the knowing transmission of
obscene or indecent messages or images to any person under the age of

eighteen, and (2) the sending or displaying of "patently offensive"
sexual messages that would be accessible to minors. 16 1 This statute
criminalized the above acts and created penalties of up to two years in
prison. 16 2 The CDA applied to all communications on the Internet, not
163
just commercial communications.
The ACLU challenged the CDA in ACLU v. Reno, and a three-judge
district court panel unanimously found that the CDA's content-based
restrictions on speech were unconstitutional. 164 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, the government argued that the CDA was constitutional
under three prior Supreme Court opinions: Ginsberg v. New York, FCC
1 65
v. PacificaFoundation,and City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.

159. See infra Part II.D.3.a-b (discussing the CDA and COPA, prior attempts to regulate
children's access to Internet materials); see also Rebecca L. Covell, Note, Problems with
Government Regulation of the Internet: Adjusting the Court'sLevel of FirstAmendment Scrutiny,
42 ARIz. L. REv. 777, 781 (2000) ("Congress has addressed the problem of child access to
Internet pornography in two ways-by regulating transmission of pornographic material over the
Internet and by regulating receipt of the information.").
160. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 133
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000 & West Supp. 2003)).
161. 47 U.S.C. § 223(d)(I)(A)-(B) (2000), amended by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21,
§ 603(2), 117 Stat. 650, 687 (2003). The CDA defined a "minor" as an individual under the age
of eighteen; the Child Online Protection Act defined a minor as an individual under seventeen
years of age. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 876 (stating that an individual can be charged if he or
she transmits a message or image while knowing that it is likely that one or more minors will
view it). The Supreme Court argued that without adequate age verification processes, and given
the large number of Internet-users, including those who are minors, it is possible that any
transmission may be viewed by a minor. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 876.
162. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(2), amended by Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 603(1), 117 Stat. at 687. An
individual who violated the CDA was subject to a fine, imprisonment of up to two years, or both.
Id.
163. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 568-69 (2002) (plurality opinion) (distinguishing
the problems with the CDA from the subsequently enacted Child Online Protection Act).
164. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849, 857, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (issuing a preliminary
injunction after finding that the plaintiffs likely would succeed on the merits with their facial
invalidation claim).
165. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 864; see City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S.
41, 54-55 (1986) (holding that a city ordinance requiring adult theaters to be more than 1000 feet
away from any residential zone did not violate the First Amendment's freedom of expression);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-51 (1978) (holding that the FCC acted
constitutionally when it regulated a radio broadcast that consisted of inappropriate language);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968) (upholding a statute that created a rule that
materials may be obscene as to minors but not as to adults). In defending the CDA, the
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the case at
The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and distinguished
66
1
grounds.
numerous
on
above
listed
three
the
hand from
In addition, the Supreme Court found that many terms within the
CDA created uncertainty among Internet users. 16 7 Although the
government argued that the CDA only applied to "pornographic"
material, the Court found to be overly vague the term "indecent" and the
section stating "in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or

excretory activities or organs."'

68

Also, the Court held that the CDA created uncertainty because the
statute required courts to judge the materials according to
government argued that the CDA was an attempt to "cyberzone" the Internet, thereby placing
inappropriate materials out of the reach of children. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 867-68. See
generally Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (distinguishing between zoning
and filtering options), in CYBERLAW: PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 434-35 (Patricia Bellia et al. eds., 2003); Lessig & Resnick, supra note 30, at
395 (discussing alternative solutions to the CDA and the Child Online Protection Act); Hunter,
supra note 32, at 41-44 (rejecting the argument that the CDA was a proper attempt to zone the
Internet). The zoning solution, as compared to the filtering solution, is narrower, because "there
would be no incentive for speakers to block out listeners; the incentive of a speaker is to have
more, not fewer listeners." Lessig, supra, at 435.
166. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 864-68. The Court distinguished the CDA from the statute in
Ginsberg in the following ways: (1)the statute in Ginsberg did not affect parents' abilities to
purchase materials for their children, whereas the CDA may punish parents who, for example,
send safe sex information to their child in college; (2) the Ginsberg statute only applied to
commercial transactions, whereas the CDA applies to all material; (3) the Ginsberg statute
included in the definition of what is "harmful to minors" a requirement that it was "utterly
without redeeming social importance to minors"; and (4) where the CDA defines minor as an
individual under the age of eighteen, the Ginsberg statute applied to those under the age of
seventeen. Id. at 865-66.
The Court in Reno distinguished the CDA from the ordinance in Renton because the zoning
ordinance in Renton targeted the "secondary effects" of the adult theaters, such as crime and
deterioration of property values. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 868. The Court found that the CDA
targeted the primary effects of children's access to "indecent" or "patently offensive" materials
and, therefore, constituted a content-based restriction on speech, subjecting it to strict scrutiny.
Id.; see also Hunter, supra note 32, at 43 (applying the Renton three-prong test to the CDA). The
three-part test addresses (1) whether the regulation was content-neutral, (2) whether the regulation
was narrowly tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest, and (3) whether the regulation
left adequate room for alternatives. Id.
The Court distinguished the statute in Pacifica from the CDA because the material in question
in Pacifica was a specific broadcast, the FCC's declaratory order was not a criminal sanction, and
the material in question was broadcast on a medium that had "received the most limited First
Amendment protection." Id. at 867.
167. Rena v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 871 ("This uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the
CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially
harmful materials.").
168. Id. at 870-71; see 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2000) (outlining the provisions required by the
CDA prior to the PROTECT Act amendments), amended by PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21,
§ 603(1), 117 Star. 650, 687 (2003).
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"contemporary community standards."'16 9 This concept is difficult to
apply to Internet materials because an individual may send an image or
message from one state without knowing whether it will be viewed
outside of the sender's state. 170 The Court feared that by applying
"community standards" to a world-wide medium in which distributors
do not know where recipients may access the materials, the materials
would be judged by the most strict and conservative definitions, thereby
17 1
severely hindering adults' abilities to access protected materials.
Thus, the Court found that the terms of the CDA were overbroad and
not narrowly tailored, thereby rendering the statute an unconstitutional
17 2
limitation on free speech.
The CDA also included provisions describing affirmative defenses
that applied when one either took good faith measures to protect against
minors accessing the indecent materials or used a method of age
verification. 173 However, the Court considered the fact that only
commercial websites could normally afford the approved age
verification methods, which would impact non-commercial websites
significantly, and that such measures might discourage adults from
accessing materials available to them. 174 The Court also took issue with
169. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877-78; see supra note 99 and accompanying text
(addressing how courts apply "contemporary community standards" to Internet materials).
170. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 575-82 (2002) (plurality opinion) (discussing how
the Third Circuit addressed the difficulties when applying "contemporary community standards"
to the Internet); ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[W]eb publishers are
currently without the ability to control the geographic scope of the recipients of their
communications.").
171. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 877-78.
172. Id. at 882.
In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive
and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose
that the statute was enacted to serve.
Id. at 874.
173. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A)-(B) (2000). It is a defense that a person "has taken, in good
faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
access by minors to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any
appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications, including any method which
is feasible under available technology." Id. § 223(e)(5)(A). It is a defense that a person "has
restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number." Id. § 223(e)(5)(B). See generally
COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 25-27 (describing the two main ways in
which websites verified their patrons' ages and discussing issues related to the use of credit cards
or independently-issued identification as forms of age verification).
174. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 856-57 (reasoning that the high cost of implementing a credit
card system for age verification would be financially beyond the reach of noncommercial
websites). Although these methods historically have been used by commercial websites, there are
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the age verification defense in the statute, stating that it was not
"technologically feasible" to allow minors to access protected materials,
such as art discussions, while blocking access to "indecent" or "patently
offensive" materials. 175 Thus, only the part of the CDA prohibiting the
knowing transmission of obscene materials survived constitutional
76
review, since obscenity does not enjoy First Amendment protections. 1
b. Child Online Protection Act
After the Supreme Court struck down certain provisions of the CDA
in Reno v. ACLU, Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act
("COPA") in yet another attempt to control children's access to online
materials. 177 COPA applies only to information on the Web and
prohibited individuals from knowingly making commercial materials
available to minors. 178 For COPA to apply, the materials must (1) depict
or represent in a "patently offensive" manner as pertains to minors or
sexual acts or body parts of minors, (2) have been intended to appeal to
a prurient interest of minors, and (3) "lack serious literary, artistic,

many websites offering free access to pornographic materials. See Rodden, supra note 153, at
2145 (discussing the means by which some websites offer free, uninhibited access to
pornographic materials). There are many ways in which individuals, including minors, may
access inappropriate online materials for free:
[M]any sexually explicit sites are free of charge and do not require user registration
information. Innocuous domain names and ambiguous site descriptions sometimes
make it difficult to avoid viewing pornographic material. Users often unintentionally
reach sexually explicit sites, and recurring pop-up windows impede users' ability to
exit these sites once they are accessed. Industry mechanisms such as "kidnappings"redirecting
users
from
legitimate
websites
to pornographic
ones-and
"mousetrappings"-disabling "back" and "close" buttons, and linking users to
additional sexually explicit sites-force users to view pornographic information
against their will. Furthermore, the structure of the Internet affords accidental
exposure to inappropriate information more readily than other forms of media because
"sex on the Internet is not segregated and signposted like in a bookstore."
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Covell, supra note 159, at 777-79 (discussing the means by which
website designers trap viewers, forcing them to view inappropriate materials on the Internet, and
the particular harm it causes minors).
175. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 856. Furthermore, the government did not offer evidence as
to any methods that could adequately screen out offensive materials, meaning that adults' access
to protected materials, including indecent but not obscene materials, was affected. Id. at 855-56.
176. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 569 (2002) (plurality opinion); Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. at 883.
177. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1401-1406, 112 Stat. 2681-736
(1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230-231 (2000)); see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 883 (striking
down provisions of the CDA as being unconstitutionally overbroad).
178. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000); see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 574 (plurality opinion)
(analyzing the material according to the Miller test for obscenity). See generally supra notes 9798 and accompanying text (discussing the Miller test).
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of
political, or scientific value for minors." 179 An individual's violation
0
COPA provisions could lead to criminal and/or civil penalties.18
Congress drafted COPA in an attempt to avoid some of the problems
18 1
that caused the Supreme Court to strike down most of the CDA.
First, COPA only applies to commercial transactions. 182 Second,

COPA only applies to information on the World Wide Web, which
excluded, for example, e-mails. 183 Third, COPA prohibited materials

that are "harmful to minors," a much narrower class of materials than
those that are "indecent" or "patently offensive."184

179. 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 578-79 (plurality
opinion). "Harmful to minors" is defined as
any communication... that is obscene or that(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find, taking the material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to
appeal to, or is designed to pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with
respect to minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or
simulated normal or perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or
post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value for minors.
47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6).
180. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 570-71 (plurality opinion).
Under COPA, the penalties are as follows:
(1) Prohibited conduct. Whoever knowingly and with knowledge of the character
of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web,
makes any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any minor and
that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall be fined not more than
$50,000, imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
(2) Intentional violations. In addition to the penalties under paragraph (1),
whoever intentionally violates such paragraph shall be subject to a fine of not more
than $50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day of violation
shall constitute a separate violation.
(3) Civil penalty. In addition to the penalties under paragraphs (1) and (2),
whoever violates paragraph (1) shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than
$50,000 for each violation. For purposes of this paragraph, each day of violation shall
constitute a separate violation.
47 U.S.C. § 23 1(a).
181. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 569-70 (plurality opinion) (distinguishing the CDA's
problematic provisions from COPA).
182. Id. at 569.
183. Id. The CDA applied to all transmissions over the Internet, which included e-mails, not
just commercial transactions. Id.
184. See id. at 569-70 (distinguishing the content outlawed by COPA and stating that it is
more narrowly defined than the categories under the CDA that the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional). Similar to the CDA, COPA did contain some affirmative defenses:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good
faith, has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
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In ACLU v. Ashcroft, a group of plaintiffs challenged COPA,
claiming that the statute infringed on constitutionally protected speech
because the application of "contemporary community standards" to
what was deemed as "harmful to minors" hindered adults' access to
protected speech. 185 While noting that using "contemporary community
standards" to analyze materials on the Web was problematic because the
Web is an international medium, 186 the Supreme Court nonetheless held
that COPA's "contemporary community standards" provision by itself
18 7
did not render the entire statute unconstitutional.
The Court distinguished COPA from the CDA by noting that COPA
covered considerably fewer materials. 188 Additionally, the Supreme
Court reasoned that COPA included extra conditions-that the materials
are designed to appeal to the prurient interest of minors and lack serious
artistic or social value for minors-which distinguished COPA from the
CDA. 189
The Court further explained that the application of
"contemporary community standards" does not relate to specific
geographic areas. 190 Instead, a juror may use personal knowledge of his
or her current or former home community. 19 1 Therefore, Justice
Thomas's plurality opinion held, in a very limited sense, that COPA's

personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available
technology.
47 U.S.C. § 23 1(c)(1).
185. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 571 n.4, 571-72 (plurality opinion). The plaintiffs'
websites "contain[ed] 'resources on obstetrics, gynecology, and sexual health; visual art and
poetry; resources designed for gays and lesbians; information about books and stock photographic
images offered for sale; and online magazines."' Id. at 571 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d
473, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1999)).
186. Id. at 575 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d, 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2000)).
187. Id. at 585.
188. Id. at 578. COPA is limited to materials on the World Wide Web, whereas the CDA
applied to all Internet materials. Id. at 569. Also, the CDA applied to "indecent" materials that
depicted or described sexual or excretory activities or organs, not just materials that were obscene
or harmful to minors. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858-59 (1997) (describing the
provisions of the CDA).
189. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 578-79 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court focused
on the second of these conditions, because this element under COPA was not subject to
"contemporary community standards." Id. at 579. The correct analysis, according to the Court, is
"whether a reasonable person would find... value in the material, taken as a whole." Id. (citing
Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 (1987)). The Court previously had stated that contemporary
community standards do not apply to the serious value of the materials because "the value of [a]
work [does not] vary from community to community based on the degree of local acceptance it
has won." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 873 (citing Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987)).
190. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 576-77.
191. Id.
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"contemporary community standards" provision, used to identify
material harmful to minors, by itself, did not render the entire statute

unconstitutional.

192

E. Using the Spending Clause To Regulate
The Spending Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to

provide for the general welfare through funding of programs and
services. 19 3 In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court explained that
under the Spending Clause, Congress has the power to regulate areas
194
that the Constitution does not specifically designate to Congress.

Therefore, Congress may use the Spending Clause to justify legislative
regulation of areas that normally may not be under legislative

control. 195
When exercising its powers under this clause, Congress has wide
latitude, including the power to attach conditions on the acceptance of
federal funding. 19 6 Yet, Congress may not impose conditions that
192. Id. at 585. The question on appeal was whether COPA's use of "community standards"
to identify materials that are "harmful to minors" violated the First Amendment. Id. at 575-76.
The Court remanded the case for further examination of the ACLU's other claims. Id. at 586.
The Supreme Court declined to rule on whether the statute as a whole was unconstitutionally
vague, or whether a strict scrutiny analysis was appropriate. Id. at 585-86. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals heard this case on remand and again upheld the district court's issuance of a
preliminary injunction, stating that the ACLU likely would succeed on the merits by proving
COPA's failure to meet strict scrutiny and that COPA was overbroad. ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322
F.3d 240, 268 (3d Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari for another review
of COPA, and this time the review will focus on restrictions on children's speech that affect
adults' access to constitutionally protected speech. Associated Press, High Court To Revisit
Online-Porn Law (Oct. 14, 2003), available at http://www.msnbc.comlnews/980102.asp (last
visited Mar. 16, 2004).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Constitution allows Congress to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States." Id. Under the General Welfare Clause, Congress may
decide which expenditures will best promote general welfare. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90
(1976). Congress's authorization to expend funds for the general welfare is not limited to
Congress's constitutionally enumerated grants of power. Id. Additionally, Congress's Spending
Clause powers are limited only by those that are constitutionally enumerated. Id. at 90-101. The
Constitution does not obligate Congress to use its Spending Clause powers to give funds to states;
rather, the funds are treated like gifts. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686-87 (1999).
194. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
195. Id. Congress is still limited to spending federal funds only for the "general welfare" of
the United States. Id. Both Congress and numerous courts have recognized that protecting
children from accessing materials that are harmful to minors is a compelling government interest,
which likely would suffice to meet the "general welfare" requirement. See supra note 158 (citing
cases in which courts have recognized a compelling interest in protecting children from harmful
materials).
196. Id. at 210 (allowing the federal government to limit funds to states that had legal drinking
ages of at least twenty-one); see also id. at 206 ("Incident to this power, Congress may attach
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require recipients to engage in activities that violate the Constitution. 197
The Supreme Court has ruled that conditions attached to the acceptance
of funding may not necessarily "induce" the recipients to violate the
Constitution. 198 Thus, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
the government may not deny benefits to a person through a method
that infringes upon her or his freedom of speech. 199
Yet, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that it was an
appropriate legislative function of the government to prefer or
encourage one type of activity over another. 200 In Rust, the Supreme
Court held that Congress acted constitutionally when it enacted a statute
that placed limits on funding for family planning services, effectively
20 1
restricting information on abortion and abortion services.
Consequently, Congress's decision to fund one type of protected
activity over another does not mean that the denial of funding for other

conditions on the receipt of federal funds, and has repeatedly employed the power 'to further
broach policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the
recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives."' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980))); Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590 (1998)
(holding that the NEA procedure of convening a "diverse" review panel to provide guidance in
awarding grants to artists was appropriate); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding
limits placed on funding for family planning services, which restricted information on abortion
and abortion services, constitutional).
197. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210. But see Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540,
549 (1983) ("[A] legislature's decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does
not infringe the right."). Some conditions may rise to the level of inducing recipients to violate
Constitutional rights, reaching a point where "pressure turns into compulsion." Dole, 483 U.S. at
211. However, Justice Cardozo cautioned that "to hold that motive and temptation is equivalent
to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties." Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)); see also Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 ("If the NEA were to leverage
its power to award subsidies on the basis of subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored
viewpoints, then we would confront a different case."). For a discussion of how the lower courts
have had difficultly delineating between "financial inducement" and "coercion," see Lynn A.
Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting Off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending
Doctrine and How a Too-clever Congress Could Provoke It To Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 467-69
& nn.53-54 (2003).
198. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11.
199. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 191.
200. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 ("There is a basic difference between direct state interference with
a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative
policy." (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977))). Whereas the plurality in United
States v. American Library Ass'n found that Rust applied to CIPA's filtering conditions, Justice
Stevens disagreed, arguing that Rust only applies to situations where the government is trying to
communicate a specific message. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 n.7 (2003) (plurality opinion);
id. at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Stevens reasoned, the Library Services and Technology
Act and "E-rate" discount statutes, which CIPA amended, were enacted to promote access to the
Internet, particularly in low-income areas. Id. at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199-200.
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protected activities constitutes a penalty.2 0 2 The Supreme Court,
however, also ruled that attaching conditions upon the recipients, rather
or services, may extend beyond congressional
than on the programs
20 3
spending power.
The Court did not view the attachment of undesirable conditions to
funding as a penalty, for the recipients could still continue their
practices by seeking alternate funding. 204 The denial of funding is not a
penalty because recipients are not compelled to operate federally funded
programs. 20 5 Rather, the Court explained that by accepting federal
dollars, recipients voluntarily consent to conditions placed on the
funding. 20 6 To avoid the restrictions, the recipient may20 7choose to
decline the federal funding to avoid the attached conditions.
202. Id. In Rust, the petitioners argued that they had been subject to viewpoint discrimination
by the government. Id. at 194. However, the Court reasoned that excluding abortion services and
the discussion of this option for pregnant women from Congress's definition of "family planning"
did not constitute a penalty. Id. at 199 n.5.
203. Id. at 197; see also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400-01 (1984)
(invalidating a federal law which prohibited federally-funded noncommercial television and radio
stations from editorializing).
204. See Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 579-80 (1998); Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-200. The denial of
federal funding also did not make it impossible for the recipients of federal funding to talk about
abortion. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197-200. Rather, they could not discuss abortion as part of the
federally funded "family planning" grant. Id.; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (ruling that Congress is not required to provide public funding for
lobbying activities).
205. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5. Some commentators have argued that the Court should
redefine the coercion element under Dole so that it would be impermissibly coercive if the
condition placed upon the funding "presents a state with either no rational choice or no fair choice
but to accept, even if it leaves the state with a practical choice not to." Baker & Berman, supra
note 197, at 520-21.
206. Rust, 500 U.S. 199 n.5; see also Baker & Berman, supra note 197, at 522.
[M]ost lower courts seem to read Dole as implicating the "no practical choice"
conception of what it means to be impermissibly coerced: if a state could reject the
condition [imposed on receiving federal funding] and still survive essentially as a state,
then acceptance of the condition is freely chosen and the condition is not
impermissibly coercive.
Id.
207. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199 n.5 (citing Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575 (1984)).
By accepting Title X funds, a recipient voluntarily consents to any restrictions placed
on any matching funds or grant-related income. Potential grant recipients can choose
between accepting Title X funds-subject to the Government's conditions that they
provide matching funds and forgo abortion counseling and referral in the Title X
project-or declining the subsidy and financing their own unsubsidized program. [The
Supreme Court has] never held that the Government violates the First Amendment
simply by offering that choice.... [A program] is in no way "barred from using even
wholly private funds to finance" its proabortion activities outside the Title X program.
Id. at 199. An example of Congress's use of its Spending Clause powers is Finley, in which
Congress enacted a law in reaction to certain art exhibits deemed by some to be offensive.
Finley, 524 U.S. at 575-76. These exhibits were funded by grants from the National Endowment
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III. DISCUSSION: CIPA CHALLENGED IN UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN
LIBRARY ASSOCIATION

On June 23, 2003, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
United States v. American Library Ass'n, basing its holding on
Spending Clause and First Amendment precedent. 20 8 The Justices
submitted five opinions, none able to capture a majority, with six9
20
justices agreeing that CIPA was constitutional and three dissenting.
The Supreme Court reversed the district court opinion by holding the
CIPA filtering conditions constitutional. 2 10 As a result, libraries
receiving either the "E-rates" or Library Services and Technology Act
("LSTA") funds must implement a filtering technology to block access
2 11
to obscenity, child pornography, and materials "harmful to minors."
The Court's five opinions consisted of the Court's plurality opinion,
authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, in which Justices O'Connor,

Scalia, and Thomas joined; two concurring opinions, authored by
Justices Kennedy and Breyer, respectively; and two dissenting opinions,
one authored by Justice Stevens and the other authored by Justice
2 12
Souter and joined by Justice Ginsburg.
for the Arts ("NEA"), and, consequently, the NEA was forced to revise its procedures for making
funding decisions, which included having to convene a panel to provide diverse opinions and
guidance in awarding grants and taking "decency and respect" into consideration. Id. at 576.
However, the Court reasoned that the statute in question stopped short of committing viewpoint
discrimination because the statute guided the NEA's decision-making while reforming the NEA's.
procedures without operating as a tool to preclude protected speech. Id. at 582. The Supreme
Court also stated that "decency and respect" was but one factor in making funding
determinations. Id. at 583. See generally FARBER, supra note 30, at 30-31 (providing a
definition of viewpoint discrimination).
The phrase 'viewpoint discrimination' is not self-explanatory. Presumably, the idea is
that some perspectives on a topic are allowed while opposing views are not.... [One]
problem is deciding what counts as an opposing viewpoint, because this depends on
how we conceptualize the relevant debate. The easiest picture involves one person
affirming and the other denying a proposition. A statute that distinguishes between a
statement and its negation is clearly viewpoint-based.
Id.
208. ALA II, 123 S.Ct. 2297 (2003) (plurality opinion). See generally infra Part IHI.C
(outlining each justice's opinions in the case at hand).
209. ALA 11, 123 S.Ct. at 2300.
210. Id. at 2303 (plurality opinion).
211. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6) (2000) (defining the requirement of certain libraries to certify
that they have implemented a technology protection measure to protect children from the above
three categories of content); see also infra notes 216-18 (describing the E-rate discounts and
LSTA programs).
212. ALA I1, 123 S. Ct. at 2300. See generally infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's plurality opinion); infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion); infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Justice Breyer's concurring opinion); infra Part II.C.4
(discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion); infra Part III.C.5 (discussing Justice Souter's
dissenting opinion).
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The Facts

Congress feared that federal

subsidies for the Internet were

facilitating access in public libraries to obscenity, child pornography,
and other materials "harmful to minors." 2 13 Hence, pursuant to its
Spending Clause powers, Congress enacted CIPA.2 14
This Act
permitted public libraries to accept two types of federal funding only by
complying with certain conditions; moreover, CIPA created a national
standard for dealing with online pornography rather than allowing
2 15
localities to decide how to handle the issue.
The first type of funding, through the LSTA, provided libraries with
funds to access information through electronic networks and to reach
out and assist underserved or rural communities. 2 16 The LSTA
originally did not include filtering requirements for libraries; however,
CIPA amended the LSTA to impose the filters as a requirement for

213. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2302 ("Congress learned that adults 'us[e] library computers to
access pornography that is then exposed to staff, passersby, and children,' and that 'minors
acces[s] child and adult pornography in libraries."'). See generally Kathleen Conn, Protecting
Children From Internet Harm (Again): Will the Children's Internet Protection Act Survive
Judicial Scrutiny?, 153 EDUC. L. REP. 469, 486-91 (2001) (discussing a textual analysis of CIPA
provisions, including a discussion of terms such as "technology protection measures," "harmful to
minors," "Internet safety policies," and "local agencies").
214. ALA 11, 123 S.Ct. at 2302.
215. Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that that CIPA acts as a "blunt nationwide
restraint on adult access" to protected materials). Before the enactment of CIPA, close to 17% of
public libraries used some type of filtering software on at least some of their computer terminals,
while 7% of public libraries had filtering software on all of their terminals. Id. at 2302 (plurality
opinion); see supra Part II.E (discussing Spending Clause precedent). Reportedly, President
Clinton had reservations about signing CIPA into law:
Clinton stated that although his administration has been actively involved in protecting
children from harmful internet material, he was "disappointed" with the form of the
legislation that Congress had chosen. Clinton preferred local development and
implementation of an internet use plan, which he believed would be more effective
than mandatory filtering.... He was also concerned that the weakness of current
filtering technology would not be able to distinguish between harmful and non-harmful
content, and would thus limit access to valuable information in a way that would
interfere with First Amendment rights to free speech. His goal, therefore, was to work
within the confines of the statute as it was written, "to implement the policy in a way
that maximizes local flexibility and minimizes local burdens within the framework of
the statute."
Susannah J. Malen, Protecting Children in the Digital Age: A Comparison of Constitutional
Challenges to CIPA and COPA, 26 COLUM J.L. & ARTS 217, 228-29 (2003) (citations omitted).
216. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2301 (stating that for the fiscal year 2002, Congress set aside
over $149 million for LSTA funding).
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receiving LSTA funds. 2 17 The second type of funding, "E-rate"
2 18
discounts, subsidized the cost of Internet services and connections.
To receive either type of funding, libraries must certify to the Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") that they have an Internet
protection policy and have installed a "technology protection measure"
to block access to certain materials. 2 19 A "technology protection
measure" filters or restricts access to materials designated by the
statute. 220 Specifically, the technology protection measure required by
the act must prohibit access, by all users, of "visual depictions"
constituting "obscenity" or "child pornography," as well as restricting
minors' access to materials that are "harmful to minors." 2 2 1 CIPA also
requires that libraries equip all Internet-accessible computers with the
2 22
filtering software.
CIPA permits libraries to disable the filtering technology to allow
access for bona fide research or any other lawful purposes. 22 3 However,
217. See Malen, supra note 215, at 227 (providing a background of the LSTA funds prior to
CIPA's enactment).
218. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2301 (stating that, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2002,
public libraries received approximately $58.5 million in E-rate discounts).
219. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B) (2000). If a library fails to certify with the FCC that it is
complying with CIPA, the library will not receive services under LSTA or the E-rates until they
comply. Children's Internet Protection Act Certifications Required from Recipients of Discounts
Under the Federal Universal Service Support Mechanism for Schools and Libraries, 47 C.F.R.
§ 54.520(d) (2003). See generally Conn, supra note 213, at 486-87 (providing a textual analysis
of "technology protection measures").
220. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(I) (2000 & West Supp. 2003).
221. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i), (C)(i); ALA II,
123 S.Ct. at 2302; see 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(D) (defining a minor as "any individual who has
not attained the age of 17 years"). CIPA defines materials that are "harmful to minors" as
any picture, image, graphic file or other visual depiction that
(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest
in nudity, sex or excrement;
(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect
to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact,
actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the
genitals; and
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value as to minors.
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G). For more definitions, see 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(E)-(F) (stating that
CIPA's definition of "obscene" is the same as the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1460 and CIPA's
definition of "child pornography" is the same as the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 2256).
222. See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; Children's Internet Protection Act,
If a library
16 F.C.C.R. 8182, para. 30 (2001) [hereinafter FCC CIPA Implementation].
knowingly fails to comply with CIPA's filtering requirement, it must pay back the amount of its
federal monies under the LSTA or E-rate program for the time period during which there was
noncompliance. 47 C.F.R. § 54.520(e).
223. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D); ALA I, 123 S. Ct. at 2302.
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libraries receiving funds under the E-rate program may disable the
filters only "during use by an adult. '2 24 In contrast, libraries receiving
funds under the LSTA program may disable the filters during use by

any person. 225

Therefore, under the LSTA program, libraries can

provide access to (1) materials protected by the First Amendment, such
as pornographic material, which would be deemed "harmful to minors"
but protected for adults; or (2) constitutionally protected materials that
226
were blocked incorrectly.
B. The DistrictCourtDecision
Four groups of plaintiffs brought suit in the District Court for the
Eastern
District
of
Pennsylvania
challenging
CIPA's
constitutionality. 2 27 Due to the limits of the filtering technology, the
district court determined that public libraries could never comply with

CIPA's requirements without also restricting access to a substantial

amount of protected speech.2 28
The plaintiff group of libraries claimed that the use of filtering
software constituted a content-based restriction on their patrons' access
to materials protected by the Constitution, thereby subjecting the statute
to strict scrutiny. 229 The plaintiffs further argued that CIPA was not

224. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D).
225. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3).
226. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d. 401, 485 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing an interpretation of the
statutory provisions that call for libraries to disable the filters if a patron seeks access to
constitutionally protected speech).
227. Id. at 407. The first two groups of plaintiffs consisted of libraries and library
associations that received federal subsidies under the E-rate and the LSTA. Id. at 414-15. The
second group of plaintiffs consisted of patrons who tried to access information that was blocked
by each of their respective library's filters. Id. at 415 (stating that one woman, Emmalyn Rood,
tried to access information about her sexual identity when she was a teen and another patron
attempted to find information about breast reconstructive surgery after his mother was diagnosed
with breast cancer). Id. The third group of plaintiffs consisted of website publishers whose
websites were blocked by filtering software, such as Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
an operator of a website aimed at gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered individuals, and a
congressional candidate. Id. The district court gave an expedited review of the case because
libraries needed to certify their compliance with CIPA by July 1, 2002. Id. at 408; see 47 C.F.R.
§ 54.520(d)(1) (stating that if a library knowingly fails to submit the certification of its
compliance with CIPA, it will not be eligible for the funding under the federal program until such
certification is submitted).
228. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
229. Id. See generally supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
of strict scrutiny analysis).
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23 1
narrowly
tailored
serveheard
a compelling
interest. 2 30 A threejudge
district
courttopanel
the case.government

1. Spending Clause Analysis
The district court agreed with the parties that an analysis of

Congress's Spending Clause powers was the proper framework for the
case at hand. 232 Because CIPA attaches the condition that recipients
must install filtering software on all of their computers to receive
federal funding, the district court examined whether this condition
overstepped Congress's powers. 2 33 The plaintiffs challenged CIPA's
conditions, claiming that the use of filtering technology induced the
libraries to violate the First Amendment; however, the plaintiffs and the
government disagreed regarding whether CIPA constituted an
234
"inducement."
The plaintiffs claimed that the mandated use of Internet filters, as
required by CIPA, was facially unconstitutional because it forced
libraries to infringe upon their patrons' First Amendment rights, and
235
therefore, Congress exceeded its Spending Clause powers.

230. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
231. Id. This district court panel was authorized by statute. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 230203 (2003).
232. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 450. See generally supra Part .E (discussing Spending
Clause jurisprudence).
233. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 450. The district court looked to four rules, which were
outlined in South Dakota v. Dole:
First, "the exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare."'
Second, any conditions that Congress sets on states' receipt of federal funds must be
sufficiently clear to enable recipients "to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of
the consequences of their participation." Third, the conditions on the receipt of federal
funds must bear some relation to the purpose of the funding program. And finally,
"other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional
grant of federal funds."
Id. (citations omitted). For further discussion of Spending Clause jurisprudence, see generally
supra Part II.E.
234. ALA 1,201 F. Supp. 2d at 450-51; see supra note 197 and accompanying text (outlining
the rule that Congress may not, under its Spending Clause powers, induce a funding recipient to
violate the Constitution).
235. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 407. The plaintiffs argued three other alternative theories for
the facial invalidation of CIPA. Id. at 407 n.l. First, the plaintiffs argued that CIPA is facially
invalid because (1)it "impose[d] an unconstitutional condition on public libraries by requiring
them to relinquish their own First Amendment rights to provide unfiltered Internet access as a
condition on their receipt of federal funds"; (2) it "effect[ed] an impermissible prior restraint on
speech by granting filtering companies and library staff unfettered discretion to suppress speech
before it has been received by library patrons and before it has been subject to a judicial
determination that it is unprotected under the First Amendment"; and (3) CIPA is
unconstitutionally vague. Id.; see Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment:
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Generally, when dealing with a claim of facial invalidity, 236 a court may
sustain the challenge if the plaintiffs can show that the statute provides
for no constitutionally sound application. 237 However, the district court
recognized that a limited exception existed, permitting the facial

invalidation of a statute that restricted a substantial amount of protected
speech, regardless of the fact that the statute may be constitutional in
23 8
certain circumstances.
2. Strict Scrutiny
The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate analysis, finding that the use of filters constituted a contentbased restriction on speech because the filters block speech based on the
subject (such as being sexually explicit) in a public forum. 239 The
district court reasoned that although the Internet does not enjoy the
Ruminations on Public Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191,
208-14 (2001) (discussing the doctrine of prior restraint in the context of Internet filters).
236. In order to make a successful facial invalidation claim, plaintiffs must show that there is
not a set of circumstances under which the legislative act will comply with the Constitution. Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991).
A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to
mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid. The fact that [the regulations] might
operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient
to render [them] wholly invalid.
Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 421 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Conversely, an "as-applied"
challenge arises when there is a particular set of circumstances that render the legislation in
question unconstitutional. See ALA I, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing
the possibility of an as-applied challenge to the use of filtering software in libraries if the
particular facts merit that review).
237. ALA1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 451.
238. Id. at 451-52. The plaintiffs argued that the CIPA filter requirement "chilled" protected
speech. Id. at 452. The plaintiffs feared that because of the need for federal funding, some
libraries would go along with CIPA's requirements and limit patrons' access to protected
materials. Id. "The Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill
speech within the First Amendment's vast and privileged sphere. Under this principal, [a law] is
unconstitutional on its face if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected expression." Ashcroft
v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). On the facial invalidation claim, the district
court did not decide the issue of whether the plaintiffs would have to show that CIPA induced the
states to engage in unconstitutional activities or that CIPA restricted library patrons' access to a
significant amount of constitutionally protected materials, thereby causing libraries to violate the
First Amendment. ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 453. The district court assumed that the plaintiffs
would have to show that any library complying with CIPA would effectively violate the First
Amendment. Id.
239. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 409, 460. The district court found that the government created
a designated public forum when it made Internet access available in public libraries, and the
district court held that strict scrutiny applied. Id. at 457. See generally supra notes 54-60 and
accompanying text (stating that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions in public
forums).
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historical foundation of many public forums, the Internet shares many
characteristics with other public forums, such as taxpayer funding and
general availability for public use. 240 Thus, the district court held that
CIPA was subject to strict scrutiny because CIPA constituted a contentthe1 fact that
based restriction that regulates a public forum, due to 24
content.
their
on
based
websites
blocks
technology
filtering
The district court compared the filtering of Internet materials with
general library collections decisions, finding that the library had not
reviewed all of the accessible Web-based materials. 24 2 Further, the
district court found the government's argument that the library used its

240. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 466-67. Furthermore, the district court found that the public
forum protection applied to speakers and listeners, meaning that when libraries provide Internet
access, they open their doors to speakers from around the world, as well as their own patrons. Id.
at 467-68; see, e.g., id. at 470 (arguing the that Internet "provides unique possibilities for
promoting First Amendment values" and justifies the application of strict scrutiny). "[P]ublic
libraries, like sidewalks and parks, are generally open to any member of the public who wishes to
receive speech that these fora facilitate, subject only to narrow limitations." Id. at 466. But cf.
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1260 (1992) (stating that the library
in question had rules making it clear that it was open to the public only for specified purposes of
reading, studying, and using library materials, not for the exercise of all First Amendment rights).
See generally supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the appropriate levels of scrutiny for various public
forums).
241. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 409, 460. According to the court:
While the First Amendment permits the government to exercise editorial discretion in
singling out particularly favored speech for subsidization or inclusion in a state-created
forum, we believe that where the state provides access to a "vast democratic forum[],"
open to any member of the public to speak on subjects "as diverse as human
thought,"and then selectively excludes from the forum certain speech on the basis of its
These exclusions risk
content, such exclusions are subject to strict scrutiny.
fundamentally distorting the unique marketplace of ideas that public libraries create
when they open their collections, via the Internet, to the speech of millions of
individuals around the world on a virtually limitless number of subjects.
Id. at 464-65 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868, 870 (1997)). "Application of strict
scrutiny finds further support in the extent to which public libraries' provision of Internet access
uniquely promotes First Amendment values in a manner analogous to traditional public forums
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, in which content-based restrictions are always subject to
strict scrutiny." Id. at 409. See generally supra Part II.A. 1-2 (examining the distinction between
different types of public forums and their respective levels of scrutiny).
242. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 463. The district court did not follow the reasoning in
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun County Library, which relied on the
analysis that a library's decision to block websites is fundamentally different from it decisions
regarding the acquisition of print materials. Id. at 465 n.25. See generally Mainstream Loudoun
v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793-94 (1998). The district court
in American Library Ass'n v. United States reasoned that libraries have scarce resources,
especially when it comes to time and Internet access. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 465 n.25. For
example, there was testimony that patrons' demand for Internet access far outweighed the
library's supply, for allowing a patron unlimited access to the Internet leads to another patron
having to wait. Id.
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acquisition discretion unconvincing because the library made no effort
243
to review all of the blocked Internet materials.
Therefore, the court noted that for CIPA's provisions to pass
constitutional muster, they must be narrowly tailored to further a
compelling government interest. 244 The district court stated that
protecting library patrons from obscenity, child pornography, and
materials that were "harmful to minors" constituted a compelling
245
government interest.
Nevertheless, the district court held that use of filtering software was
24 6
not narrowly tailored to further the compelling government interest.
The district court examined the effectiveness of the existing filtering
technology and its limits, including the failure to block all categories of
speech required by CIPA. 247 Additionally, the district court looked to
243. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 464.
244. Id. at 410. The district court recognized that there are compelling government interests
in protecting library patrons from unwillingly viewing sexually explicit materials, along with
obscenity and child pornography, and when dealing with minors, materials that are harmful to
minors. Id. See generally supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing the elements for
passing strict scrutiny).
245. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 409, 471-72. Although the Supreme Court has not recognized
a compelling state interest in protecting unwilling viewers from constitutionally protected speech,
the district court stated that there was not a complete bar against protecting viewers from
inadvertent exposure to sexually explicit materials. Id. at 409, 472-74. The state's interest in
protecting the unwilling viewer can be found in the obscenity doctrine, which was initiated by a
case involving an unwilling viewer. Id. at 473; see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749
n.27 (1986) (stating that, when outside of the home, the scales may sometimes tip in favor of the
speaker and away from the unwilling listener, requiring the offended listener to turn away); Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (recognizing that the government has an interest in
protecting the sensibilities of unwilling recipients); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text
(discussing the Miller obscenity rule). But see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text
(discussing the elements required for passing strict scrutiny).
246. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 409-75. "The proper method for a library to deter unlawful or
inappropriate patron conduct, such as harassment or assault of other patrons, is to impose
sanctions on such conduct, such as either removing the patron from the library, revoking the
patron's library privileges, or, in the appropriate case, calling the police." Id. at 475.
247. Id. at 410 ("No category definition used by the blocking programs is identical to the legal
definitions of obscenity, child pornography, or material harmful to minors, and, at all events,
filtering programs fail to block access to a substantial amount of content on the Internet that falls
into the categories defined by CIPA."). Under CIPA, libraries are required to use a technology
measure to block visual depictions of obscenity, child pornography, and materials that are
harmful to minors. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)(i), (B)(i) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)(i),
(C)(i) (2000 & West Supp. 2003). Two reasons for why the filtering software have the
underblocking and overblocking problems are that the software companies do not re-review
websites that have been categorized, and the companies use humans, who are subject to error, in
their reviewing and categorizing processes. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d. at 436. Filtering companies
rely on human review to determine what categories websites will belong in. Id. at 476. There are
problems associated with this method, including blocking every page on a website that contains
some materials that fall into a particular category when other materials may not. Id. The
plaintiffs employed a Harvard University student, Benjamin Edelman, to quantify the number of
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numerous alternatives that may provide more appropriate options for
libraries. 248 Finally, the district court held that the disabling provisions
of CIPA did not constitute narrow tailoring because a patron's
embarrassment or desire for privacy may deter him or her from
requesting disablement of the program and librarians may not have
24 9
enough time to complete the request.
The district court concluded that CIPA's filtering requirements were
subject to strict scrutiny because the filters constituted a content-based

restriction and Internet access in public libraries constituted a public
forum. 250

Further, the court held that because the filtering software

websites that were blocked erroneously by four software companies. Id. at 442. Edelman
compiled a list of over 500,000 URLs, which he then fed through four filtering programs and sent
parts of the list for suitability review to librarians and professors of library science. Id. Even the
government's own expert testified that of the blocked Web pages that public library patrons
attempted to access, "between 6% and 15% 'contained no content' that [met] even the filtering
products' own definitions of sexually explicit content." Id. at 448; see, e.g., id. at 446-47 (listing
numerous websites that were blocked erroneously or categorized incorrectly by the filtering
software).
248. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 480-84. According to the district court:
Although these methods of detecting use of library computers to access illegal content
are not perfect, and a library, out of respect for patrons' privacy, may choose not to
adopt such policies, the government has failed to show that such methods are
substantially less effective at preventing patrons from accessing obscenity and child
pornography than software filters.
Id. at 481. The district court recognized that some of the methods, including the "tap-on-theshoulder" method, allowed for a librarian's discretion. Id. at 482. The district court further
reasoned, however, that given the instances of underblocking by the filters, librarians will have to
resort to this tactic anyway. Id. See generally Norden, supra note 87, at 780-81 (stating that
approximately "95% of all libraries providing public Internet access have a written policy or set
of guidelines to 'regulate public use of the Internet."'). Among libraries without formal Internet
use policies, 50% were in the process of designing a policy and 26% were considering
formulating such policies. Id. at 781.
249. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87. The district court stated that the Supreme Court had
ruled that "content-based restrictions that require recipients to identify themselves before being
granted access to disfavored speech are subject to no less scrutiny than outright bans on access to
such speech." Id. at 486. Some libraries have instituted procedures to allow for anonymous
requests for disabling filters. Id. at 487. Under the E-rate program, "an administrator, supervisor,
or other person authorized by the certifying authority... may disable the technology protection
measure concerned, during use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purpose." 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D). Under the LSTA subsidy, "an administrator, supervisor or
other authority may disable a technology protection measure ... to enable access for bona fide
research or other lawful purposes." 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3). However, the LSTA allows for the
disabling of the filters during use by either adults or minors. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D); 20 U.S.C.
§ 9134(f)(3); ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 414. The length of time that it takes to review a website
before deciding whether the site complies with the statutory purpose is especially problematic in
areas where libraries are short-staffed. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88. The district court also
noted that the patrons' need to request affirmatively that the filters be disabled could be
problematic when patrons are given a limited amount of time to "surf" the Internet, which they
may not want to spend talking to a librarian about unblocking a website. Id. at 488.
250. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 489.
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requirement was not narrowly tailored to the compelling government
interest of protecting against exposure to obscenity, child pornography,
and materials that are "harmful to minors," CIPA was facially
invalid. 2 5 1 Accordingly, the United States appealed, and the case
proceeded directly to the United States Supreme Court, as provided for

in CIPA.252
C. The Supreme CourtDecision
The Supreme Court reversed the district court by finding CIPA

constitutional in a plurality opinion. 253 This section first addresses
Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion, which held that CIPA was
constitutional because it did not attach an unconstitutional condition
upon the receipt of federal funding. 254 Next, this section analyzes
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion, in which he found that CIPA was
not facially unconstitutional but left open the possibility of an as-

251. Id. at 489-90. The district court also found that CIPA was severable from the other parts
of the statutes that contain the LSTA and E-rates. Id. at 494. Because the district court found
CIPA to be facially invalid on the grounds that the filtering software violates the First
Amendment, the district court did not decide the issues of whether there was a prior restraint on
protected speech and whether CIPA was invalid because it induced the recipients of federal
funding to violate the constitution. Id. at 490; see id. at 490 n.36. Similarly, the filtering software
was not narrowly tailored to a library's interest in protecting patrons from unwillingly viewing
inappropriate materials. Id. at 478.
To prevent patrons from accessing visual depictions that are obscene and child
pornography, public libraries may enforce Internet use policies that make clear to
patrons that the library's Internet terminals may not be used to access illegal speech.
Libraries may then impose penalties on patrons who violate these policies, ranging
from a warning to notification of law enforcement, in the appropriate case. Less
restrictive alternatives to filtering that further libraries' interest in preventing minors
from exposure to visual depictions that are harmful to minors include requiring
parental consent to or presence during unfiltered access, or restricting minors'
unfiltered access to terminals within view of library staff. Finally, optional filtering,
privacy screens, recessed monitors, and placement of unfiltered Internet terminals
outside of sight-lines provide less restrictive alternatives for libraries to prevent patrons
from being unwillingly exposed to sexually explicit content on the Internet.
Id. at 410. For example, the Multnomah County Library and Fort Vancouver Regional Library,
both of which were parties in ALA I, had Internet use policies that "[did] not prohibit adult
patrons from viewing sexually explicit materials on the Web, as long as they did so at terminals
with privacy screens or recessed monitors ... and as long as it [did] not violate state or federal
law to do so." Id. at 422; see also id. at 422-23 (describing other examples of libraries' Internet
use policies).
252. Pursuant to section 1741(b) of CIPA, a direct appeal can be made to the United States
Supreme Court. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 192. The government exercised this right; therefore
no court of appeals heard this case. Id.
253. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2309 (2003) (plurality opinion).
254. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the plurality's reasoning in finding that CIPA was a
constitutional exercise of Congress's Spending Clause powers).
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applied challenge to the statute. 2 55 This section then addresses Justice
Breyer's concurring opinion, in which he applied an intermediate level
of scrutiny. 256 Next, this section analyzes Justice Stevens's dissenting
opinion, in which he found CIPA unconstitutional because the statute's
provisions violated First Amendment rights and were distinguishable
from Spending Clause precedent. 25 7 Finally, this section discusses
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion, in which he found that strict
scrutiny, not rational basis, was the appropriate level of review and that
258
the filtering technology did not survive strict scrutiny.
1. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Plurality Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the plurality opinion of the Court,
in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. 25 9 The
plurality held that CIPA did not violate the First Amendment because
rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny, was the appropriate level of
scrutiny. 260 The plurality also held that CIPA did not violate the
Spending Clause because it neither constituted a penalty for its
26 1
recipients nor induced libraries to violate the Constitution.
To determine whether the CIPA filtering software requirement
violated the First Amendment, the plurality opinion began by examining
the role of public libraries in our society. 2 62 The plurality relied on the
American Library Association's Library Bill of Rights, which states that
libraries ought to provide materials for the interest and enlightenment of
the community. 2 63 To effectuate this purpose, libraries have broad

255. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion and the extent to
which his analysis differed from the plurality opinion).
256. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing Justice Breyer's concurring opinion, how he found the
need for an intermediate level of scrutiny, and his determination under this level of scrutiny).
257. See infra Part II.C.4 (discussing Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion and his reasoning
that distinguishes the case from the plurality's interpretation of Spending Clause precedent and
First Amendment requirements).
258. See infra Part 1l.C.5 (discussing Justice Souter's dissenting opinion and his conclusions
that the plurality applied the incorrect level of scrutiny and that, under the proper strict scrutiny,
CIPA would be found unconstitutional).
259. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2301 (2003) (plurality opinion).
260. Id. at 2309 (plurality opinion).
261. Id. (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.C (discussing the test for whether
Congress's use of its Spending Clause powers are unconstitutional).
262. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (plurality opinion).
263. Id. at 2303-04 (plurality opinion); see also AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, LIBRARY BILL OF
RIGHTS (Jan. 23, 1996), available at http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/statementsif/
librarybillrights.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004). The Library Bill of Rights states,
The American Library Association affirms that all libraries are forums for information
and ideas, and that the following basic policies should guide their services.
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discretion in deciding which materials to acquire and make available to
their patrons. 264 The plurality stated that the goal of libraries did not

to
include providing information on every topic. 265 Rather, libraries try 266
provide material that would be of interest to their communities.
Therefore, the plurality noted that libraries seek materials that they
consider appropriate for their patrons and have wide discretion in
the
selecting such materials. 2 67 Accordingly, libraries must consider
268
content of the materials when deciding whether to acquire them.

Because the libraries in question dealt with the public, the plurality
next addressed content-based judgments in making materials available
to the public. 269 The plurality stated that the public forum principles on
which the district court relied were inappropriate in the context of the
case. 2 70 The plurality explained that just as public forum principles,
I. Books and other library resources should be provided for the interest,
information, and enlightenment of all people of the community the library serves.
Materials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of
those contributing to their creation.
II. Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all points of
view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be proscribed or
removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval.
III. Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their
responsibility to provide information and enlightenment.
IV. Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with
resisting abridgment of free expression and free access to ideas.
V. A person's right to use a library should not be denied or abridged because
of origin, age, background, or views.
VI. Libraries which make exhibit spaces and meeting rooms available to the
public they serve should make such facilities available on an equitable basis,
regardless of the beliefs or affiliations of individuals or groups requesting their
use.
Id. The Library Bill of Rights was adopted on June 18, 1948 and was reaffirmed on January 23,
1996 by the ALA council. Id.
264. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 (plurality opinion).
265. Id. (plurality opinion).
266. Id. (plurality opinion).
267. Id. (plurality opinion).
268. Id. (plurality opinion).
269. Id. (plurality opinion).
270. Id. (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court previously held in two cases that the
government had broad discretion when making content-based judgments on public materials,
such as arts or television communications. Id. In Arkansas Educational Television Commission
v. Forbes, the Court held that public forum principles were not generally applicable to editorial
judgments made by a public television station. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523
U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998). In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Court upheld the
NEA's use of content-based criteria in making funding decisions, explaining that it is in the
"nature" of arts funding. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998). See
generally supra Part II.A.2 (discussing public forum principles); supra Part HI.B.2 (discussing
the district court's decision that CIPA was subject to strict scrutiny).
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along with the strict scrutiny analysis, were inappropriate in the public
television and arts funding realms, they were likewise inappropriate in
the context of the discretion given to libraries for the acquisition of

materials.

27 1

Further, the plurality rejected the classification of Internet access in a
public library as either a traditional or a designated public forum. 2 72 A
traditional public forum generally has a long-standing or historical
status. 2 73 Therefore, because of the recent emergence of the Internet,
the plurality stated that the Internet did not have the requisite historical
status. 2 74 The plurality similarly rejected classification of the Internet
as a designated public forum. 275 To be a designated public forum, the
government must take an affirmative step and make the property
available for public use. 27 6 The plurality stated that public libraries
provided Internet access for their patrons-not to give publishers of
Web-based materials the opportunity to express themselves. 2 77 Rather,
libraries provided Internet access so that patrons have yet another
medium for researching, learning, and recreation, which is of the same
278
appropriate quality as library print collections.
271. ALA I1, 123 S. Ct. at 2304 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.A.2
(discussing public forum principles).
272. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2304-05 (plurality opinion). See generally Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (outlining the different types of public
forums); supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (discussing the rules for finding traditional
and designated public forums); supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (discussing the
district court's finding regarding CIPA and public forums).
273. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n,
523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998) (stating that the Court "rejected the view that traditional public forum
status extends beyond its historic confines" (citation omitted)); supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text (noting traditional public forum principles).
274. ALA /, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion).
275. Id. (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (noting
designated public forum principles); supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (discussing the
district court's finding in regards to CIPA and public forums).
276. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion). "The government does not create a public
forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse." Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802).
Although the district court relied on Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia,
the plurality distinguished the limited public forum created, which involved the receipt of public
money to fund student groups that wished to use the money to publish materials, because the
people administering the fund could not engage in viewpoint discrimination. Id. (plurality
opinion). See generally supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
for a finding of designated public forum status).
277. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion). Libraries "provide Internet access [to
facilitate research], not to 'encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."' Id. (plurality
opinion) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)).
278. Id. (plurality opinion). The Court cited to a congressional finding that stated, "The
Internet is simply another method for making information available in a school or library." Id.
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Furthermore, the plurality disagreed with the district court's decision
that the libraries' discretion to choose books and other tangible
279
materials for public access was related to providing Internet access.
The district court reasoned that libraries review books using their
discretion to decide whether to obtain the material for their collections,
2 80
but are unable to review every website the Internet makes available.
However, the plurality found that the libraries' inability to review all
websites on the Internet was irrelevant because libraries historically
have chosen to exclude pornographic materials from their collections,
and such decisions were not subject to strict scrutiny. 28 1 Therefore, the
plurality reasoned that because decisions to collect or not to collect
pornographic print materials were not subject to strict scrutiny, the
decisions to exclude pornographic materials on the Internet similarly are
not subject to strict scrutiny.28 2 Moreover, the plurality stated that
libraries must apply the same discretion when dealing with online
materials as with print resources because the means through which a
library chooses its materials directly relates to its purpose of making
2 83
suitable materials available to its community.
The plurality next held that it was appropriate for libraries to restrict
access to certain categories of materials on the Internet rather than
making individualized judgments for each material.2 84 The plurality
reasoned that libraries would confront much difficulty if they chose to
screen out specific online resources that were deemed inappropriate
because new materials appear on the Internet daily, while existing
Internet materials are modified and updated constantly. 2 85 Furthermore,
the plurality stated that a vast amount of protected materials, which the
library would not have the time or means to review, would be excluded
if a library limited Internet access only to specific websites that it
286
approved.
(plurality opinion) (citing S. REP. No. 106-41, at 7 (1999)). The Internet is "no more than a
technological extension of the book stack." Id. (plurality opinion).
279. Id. at 2306 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 242-43 (discussing the district
court's finding that Internet filters should not be examined as library acquisition decisions).
280. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2306. See generally supra notes 242-43 (discussing the district
court's finding in regards to library acquisition discretion and its application to Internet filters).
281. ALA 1I, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 264-68 and
accompanying text (discussing the plurality's agreement that libraries are afforded wide
discretion in making acquisition decisions).
282. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion).
283. Id. (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 262-66 and accompanying text
(reviewing the Court's view of the role of libraries).
284. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion).

285. See id. (plurality opinion).
286. Id. (plurality opinion).
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Although the filtering technology also excluded protected materials,
the plurality held that the CIPA provision allowing libraries to disable
the filters cured this problem. 28 7 The plurality recognized the flaws of
the filtering technology but reasoned that the burden on the First
Amendment was insignificant because libraries could disable the filters
upon request. 28 8 Unlike the district court and the dissenters, the
plurality was unconcerned with the embarrassment created by a patron's
request for disablement and the time necessary to effectuate the
request.2 89
The plurality opinion concluded that although the
Constitution guaranteed the right to free speech, it did not guarantee the

right to ask for information without embarrassment. 290 Therefore, any
concerns regarding overblocking were dispelled by the "ease" of
29 1
disabling the filters.
Next, the plurality turned to the respondent's argument that by
requiring libraries to breach their First Amendment rights to provide the
public with access to protected materials, CIPA imposed an
unconstitutional condition upon the receipt of federal funding. 292 The
plurality analogized the CIPA filtering condition to the panel review of
287. ALA //, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 223-26 and
accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling provisions); supra note 249 and accompanying
text (examining how the district court treated CIPA's disabling provision).
288. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 223-26 and
accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling provisions).
289. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion). Conversely, the district court found that
patrons' embarrassment was a key factor in finding that the disabling provision did not save the
statute. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding that patrons'
embarrassment could be a deterrent to asking librarians to disable Internet filters). See generally
20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000) (permitting the filters to be disabled for both adults and children);
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000) (allowing the disabling of the filters for adults). At oral
arguments, the Solicitor General stated that a patron would have to approach a librarian to request
that the filters be disabled and would not have to explain her reasons for the request. Transcript
of Oral Argument at 4, ALA H (No. 02-361), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/02-361.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
290. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion). But see Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (arguing that requiring a patron to make affirmative steps to get his or
her mall was "an affirmative obligation which we do not think the Government may impose on
him"). In Lamont General, Congress enacted a statute that "sets administrative officials astride
the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the addressee about it, and await response before
dispatching the mall." Id. at 306. The petitioner was the addressee on material that was
considered "communist," and the post office required that he take affirmative steps to receive his
mail. Id. at 304. The Supreme Court held that the statute violated the First Amendment. Id. at
307.
291. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2307 (plurality opinion). The plurality was careful to state that
these fears would be dispelled assuming that the filtering software violated the Constitution. Id.
See generally supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling
provisions).
292. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2307 (plurality opinion).
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art grants in National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, where the plaintiffs
claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated by the statutory
requirement of a "decency" review. 29 3 The plurality rejected the
appellee's argument, stating that even if the Court found the filtering
condition unconstitutional, Congress's wide Spending Clause discretion
in attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funding would allow for
the condition. 294 The plurality compared the CIPA conditions to the
conditions on family planning dollars in Rust v. Sullivan, stating that the
government did not deny a benefit to anyone. 295 Rather, Congress
required that the recipients spend the public funds only for their
29 6
authorized purpose.
Moreover, the plurality reasoned that because public libraries
traditionally have excluded pornographic materials from their
collections, Congress acted reasonably when it imposed similar limits
on libraries' online collections. 29 7 The plurality also reasoned that
libraries were not being "penalized" if they chose not to install the
filtering technology. 298 Congress's denial of federal subsidies to a
library that refused to limit Internet access did not prohibit that library
from continuing to provide unfiltered Internet access. 299 Instead, the
293. Id. at 2304. See generally supra note 207 (discussing the Finley case).
294. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2303, 2307-08 (plurality opinion). The Court found that South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), was the appropriate framework for addressing whether
CIPA was constitutional. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2303 n.2 ("CIPA does not directly regulate
private conduct; rather, Congress has exercised its Spending Powers by specifying conditions on
the receipt of federal funds."). See generally Baker & Berman, supra note 197, at 467-69 nn.5354 (2003) (criticizing the Dole decision and offering new solutions); supra notes 196-206 and
accompanying text (describing Congress's powers to attach conditions to federal funding).
295. ALA I1, 123 S. Ct. at 2307-08 (plurality opinion). For a discussion of Rust v. Sullivan,
see supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text, and for an examination of Spending Clause
jurisprudence, see supra Part I.E.
296. ALA //, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (plurality opinion); see also supra Part II.E (discussing
Congress's powers to attach conditions to federal funding under its Spending Clause powers).
297. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct at 2308 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.E (discussing
Congress's powers to attach conditions to federal funding).
298. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (plurality opinion). A legislature's decision not to subsidize
the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe that individual's rights. Id. (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991)). See generally supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text
(examining Congress's spending powers, including the ability to attach conditions to funding).
299. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (plurality opinion). However, many of the libraries that
receive the federal subsidies in question are in rural or impoverished areas. See ALA I, 201 F.
Supp. 2d 401, 467 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("[A]bout 20.3% of Internet users with household family
income of less than $15,000 per year use public libraries for Internet access, and approximately
70% of libraries serving communities with poverty levels in excess of 40% receive E-rate
discounts."). There is an underlying equal protection argument that has been mentioned by some
commentators. See, e.g., Rodden, supra note 153, at 2154 (stating that CIPA may have a
disparate impact on low-income families). Rodden argued that because poorer school districts
and libraries rely on these federal monies to provide services to individuals and families in their
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plurality argued, CIPA merely reflected Congress's desire to provide
funds should libraries choose to limit Internet access. 300 Therefore, the
plurality held that CIPA was not an unconstitutional condition upon the
receipt of federal funding. 30 1 Accordingly, the plurality held that CIPA
was constitutional because CIPA's filtering requirement violated neither
30 2
the First Amendment nor the Spending Clause.
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court, but he
rendered his own opinion as to the reasoning. 30 3 Justice Kennedy
reduced the dispute to the issue of whether a librarian would unblock
filtered materials upon the request of a patron. 30 4 He stated that
deciding CIPA's constitutionality would be an easy issue if the libraries
unblocked a website or disabled the entire filter when an adult made a
30 5
request; however, he doubted that this would be the practice.
Justice Kennedy first noted that the district court erroneously relied
on information that was not a factual finding. 30 6 Specifically, the
district court placed significance on the great length of time that the
unblocking of the websites or disabling of the software could take at
libraries with few staff members, even though this information was not
part of the record as a factual finding. 30 7 Yet, Justice Kennedy reasoned
that the district court could not have placed too much significance on
this assertion because it still assumed that the disabling provisions of
30 8
CIPA permit a library to provide access to protected materials.
communities, these poorer families are being impacted more directly by CIPA's requirements
than are wealthier communities. Id. However, the Supreme Court did not address this issue in
ALA II.
300. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (plurality opinion). See generally supra Part II.E (discussing
Spending Clause jurisprudence).
301. ALA 1/, 123 S. Ct. at 2309 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text (noting that Congress's spending powers are limited, in that Congress may not
attach unconstitutional conditions to federal funding).
302. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2309 (plurality opinion).
303. Id. at 2309-10 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
304. Id. at 2309 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
305. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). The government stated that unblocking filtered material
upon adult request was the appropriate response. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, ALA 11
(No. 02-361), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/
02-361.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
306. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2309 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
307. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 411 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(explaining some of the problems with CIPA's disabling provision). See generally supra notes
223-26 and accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling provision).
308. ALA 1/, 123 S. Ct. at 2309 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 223-26
and accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling provision).
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Justice Kennedy echoed all of his fellow justices in recognizing that
protecting minor patrons of public libraries from inappropriate materials
constituted a compelling interest.30 9
However, Justice Kennedy
believed that Congress's solution, enacting CIPA, did not place enough
of a significant burden on protected speech for adults as to make the
statute facially invalid. 310 Rather, Justice Kennedy argued that he
would have been more willing to find CIPA unconstitutional in an "asapplied" challenge if, for example, a library did not have the capacity to
disable the filters or unblock the websites or if the filtering software
substantially hindered an adult patron's right to view constitutionally
protected speech. 31 1 Consequently, Justice Kennedy agreed with the
plurality's conclusion that the plaintiffs' facial invalidation claim should
be reversed; however, he left open the possibility of a successful "as3 12
applied" challenge.
3.

Justice Breyer's Concurring Opinion

Justice Breyer concurred with the judgment, but he concluded that
CIPA was constitutional following a different analysis. 3 13 According to
Justice Breyer, the plurality incorrectly analyzed CIPA as if it had no
First Amendment implication because, as Justice Breyer noted, CIPA
directly restricted library patrons' receipt of information, which is
within recognized First Amendment rights. 3 14 Under CIPA, according
to Justice Breyer, Congress restricted access to materials from two
extremely important sources of information: public libraries and the
3 15
Internet.
Also, while Justice Breyer stated that some form of heightened
scrutiny was proper for analyzing the constitutionality of CIPA, he did
not advocate the application of strict scrutiny to CIPA, stating that it

309. ALA If, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra note 47 and
accompanying text (noting that a compelling government interest is one prong in the strict
scrutiny analysis).
310. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
311. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
312. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally supra note 236 (discussing the difference
between facial challenges and "as-applied" challenges to statutes).
313. ALA 1I, 123 S.Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
314. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra Part II.B (examining the right to receive
information pursuant to the First Amendment).
315. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring). "The Web is. . . comparable, from
the readers' viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed
publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
853 (1997).
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was too strict a test for libraries. 316 He reasoned that CIPA's filtering
software functioned as a selection restriction, similar to the selection

decisions that libraries must engage in when choosing materials for their
collections. 3 17 Hence, Justice Breyer stated that applying strict scrutiny
with
to the selection of library materials would unreasonably interfere
3 18
libraries' discretion to choose materials for their collections.
Accordingly, Justice Breyer proposed that the Court use a higher
level of scrutiny, but not strict scrutiny. 3 19 This approach, Breyer
stated, would be in accord with the Court's analysis of speech-related
restrictions in other contexts. 320 In prior cases, the Court examined
whether the speech-related interests were disproportionate to the
justifications and the potential alternatives. 32 1 With this intermediate
test, the Supreme Court looked for a good fit between the state's
objective, the proposed restriction, and any less restrictive
alternatives. 32 2 Justice Breyer argued that this approach should

supplement strict scrutiny rather than

substitute for it, giving

316. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer argued that strict
scrutiny was too rigid a test to apply to library selection decisions because such a high level of
scrutiny "would unreasonably interfere with the discretion necessary to create, maintain, or select
a library's 'collection' (broadly defined to include all the information the library makes
available)." Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 37, 44-48 and accompanying
text (describing the levels of scrutiny as they relate to content-based regulations).
317. ALA IH,123 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer likened the filtering
software to a "kind of editing," because the software decides which materials libraries make
available to their patrons over the Internet. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also noted
that libraries must have discretion when compiling collections because of lack of resources and
because they likely follow specific collection policies. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
318. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
319. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 37, 44-48 and accompanying text
(describing strict scrutiny as it relates to content-based regulations).
320. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring); see, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997) (addressing "must-carry" provisions as speech-related restrictions
in the broadcasting and cable television arenas); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 38990 (1969) (addressing the relevance of First Amendment speech-related restrictions in radio and
television broadcasting).
321. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
322. Id. (Breyer. J., concurring). The Supreme Court has ruled:
What our decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends,"-a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable;
that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in
proportion to the interest served,' that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but, as we have put it in the other contexts. . . a means narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective.
Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citation omitted).
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323
legislatures more flexibility than the rigid strict scrutiny analysis.
However, even under this intermediate level of scrutiny, Justice Breyer

found that CIPA was constitutional.

324

Under both the strict scrutiny and his less-rigid heightened scrutiny
standards, Justice Breyer recognized the compelling government
interest in protecting children from obscenity, child pornography, and
materials that are "harmful to minors." 325 He reasoned that filtering
technology was an inexpensive yet fairly effective means for furthering
this government objective. 3 26 Even though the existing filtering
technology tends to overblock protected materials, Justice Breyer stated
32 7
that no party presented evidence of a better-fitting alternative.
Like the plurality, Justice Breyer considered the CEPA provision that
3 28
allows libraries to disable the filters or unblock protected websites.
Justice Breyer noted that library patrons must request that the librarian
disable the filters, but he did not consider this a dispositive fact because
libraries use a similar procedure for print materials that are located in
closed stacks. 329 In such instances, library patrons must ask the
librarian to obtain those materials. 330 Thus, Justice Breyer rejected the
argument that CIPA is unconstitutional, reasoning that the requirement
that patrons take an affirmative step to have the library disable the
33 1
filters was not enough to find CIPA unconstitutional.

323. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 37, 4448 and accompanying text (describing the strict level of scrutiny as it relates to content-based
regulations).
324. ALA I, 123 S.Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
325. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
"These objectives are 'legitimate' and indeed often
'compelling."' Id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 869-70
(1997) (stating that protecting minors from inappropriate materials is "compelling"); New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (finding similarly that the protection of minors from
inappropriate materials was a "compelling" interest); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19
(1973) (finding that prohibiting access to obscenity was "legitimate" when the mode of
dissemination or exhibition poses a significant danger of exposure to minors); supra text
accompanying note 47 (outlining compelling government interest as one prong of the strict
scrutiny analysis).
326. ALA 11, 123 S.Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
327. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text
(outlining compelling government interest and less restrictive alternatives as the two prongs of
strict scrutiny analysis).
328. ALA 1I, 123 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 223-26
and accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling provision).
329. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 223-26
and accompanying text (describing CIPA's disabling provision).
330. ALA /, 123 S.Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
331. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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Therefore, believing that CIPA imposed a small burden on a library
patron's access to Internet materials, Justice Breyer argued that CIPA's
filtering condition was an appropriate "fit" to the government's interest
in protecting2 children from using public libraries to access inappropriate
33
materials.
4. Justice Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens began his dissent by agreeing with the plurality that
libraries ought to have broad discretion when deciding what materials to
make available to their patrons. 33 3 He did not believe that Congress's
decision that libraries should implement filtering software to prevent
children from accessing sexually explicit materials on the Internet was
either inappropriate or unconstitutional.3 3 4 Justice Stevens also agreed
with the plurality's statement that the seven percent of libraries using
filtering software of their own volition, prior to CIPA's enactment,
acted lawfully. 3 35 However, Justice Stevens diverged dramatically from
the plurality's opinion regarding whether the government could require
other libraries in the country to employ similar filters, stating that
CIPA's filtering requirement was unconstitutional.3 3 6 Justice Stevens
also believed that one of CIPA's flaws was that it created a national
337
standard rather than a local, tailored criterion.
In reaching his conclusion that CIPA was unconstitutional, Justice
Stevens agreed with the district court's finding that the existing filtering
technology was fundamentally flawed. 338 Justice Stevens noted that
filtering software blocks websites by recognizing key words or phrases,
332. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
333. Id. at 2312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally supra text accompanying notes
264-68 (discussing the need for discretion so that libraries can meet the needs of their particular

communities).
334. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2312-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that courts
should allow libraries to experiment with filtering software as a method to protect against minors
accessing inappropriate Internet materials. Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "A law that
prohibits reading without official consent, like a law that prohibits speaking without consent,
'constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition."' Id. at
2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of
Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002)).
335. Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, Justice Stevens took issue with Congress
imposing a requirement on the other 93% of public libraries. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
336. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
337. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens reasoned that local libraries should be able
to remedy this problem by tailoring their solutions to their particular communities. Id. at 2314

(Stevens, J., dissenting).
See generally supra notes 246-49 and
338. Id. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
accompanying text (outlining the district court's findings regarding the effectiveness of the
filtering technology).
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allowing for searches of text only, but allows visual images to pass
through unblocked. 339 . Publishers of websites containing inappropriate
materials may use this loophole to their advantage by using image files,
rather than text files, to escape detection by the filters. 340 Therefore,
Justice Stevens reasoned that a substantial amount of pornographic
material may remain unblocked, giving parents a false sense of
34 1
security.
Conversely, Justice Stevens stated that the filtering software also
overblocked and restricted access to protected materials. 342
He
reasoned that overblocking was equivalent to library staff making the
decision, for each blocked website, to prevent constitutionally protected
materials from being accessed in their libraries. 34 3 Justice Stevens thus
stated that in attempting to restrict unlawful speech, the government
may not restrict protected speech. 344 Also, Justice Stevens noted that
when a website is blocked, the patron is unlikely to know what is being
restricted, and therefore whether it is worthwhile to ask for the
unblocking. 34 5
Because each library individually would handle
unblocking requests, there was no way to monitor the effect of CIPA on
patrons' use, Justice Stevens argued.3 46
Justice Stevens then considered the less restrictive alternatives
available to achieve CIPA's goal of preventing children from accessing
sexually explicit materials on the Internet. 347 Justice Stevens quoted the
district court's finding that there were alternatives such as (1)
implementing Internet use policies that explicitly inform patrons that
they may not access illegal materials; (2) requiring parental consent to,
or parental presence for, children's use of unfiltered computers; and (3)
providing minors with unfiltered access on computer terminals within a

339. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
340. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
For example, if Playboy used a logo rather than text on its website, its website would avoid being
blocked. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
341. ALA /, 123 S. Ct. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 43132).
342. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 2313-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234, 255 (2002)).
345. Id. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
346. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 411, 410 (2002)).
See generally supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the no-less-restrictivealternative requirement of strict scrutiny).
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librarian's view. 34 8 Further, Justice Stevens stated that the alternatives
considered by the district court were in line with the views of scholars
and that allowing localities to tailor solutions to their communities was
3 49
more appropriate than Congress implementing a nationwide mandate.
Justice Stevens agreed with the plaintiffs that the filtering software
3 50
distorted the Internet medium so as to restrict its normal operation.
Consequently, because the filtering software underblocked sexually
explicit materials and overblocked protected materials, despite the
Justice Stevens concluded
availability of less restrictive alternatives,
35 1
Amendment.
First
the
violated
that CIPA
Next, Justice Stevens found that CIPA imposed an unconstitutional
condition on the receipt of government funding. 35 2 Agreeing with the
plurality, Justice Stevens stressed that libraries have discretion in
making selection decisions. 35 3 Moreover, this discretion in compiling
library collections enjoys First Amendment protection because of the
government's commitment to the exchange of ideas and protection of
academic freedom. 354 Justice Stevens found that CIPA's mandate to
348. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at
410). See generally supra note 248 and accompanying text (addressing the district court's
discussion of alternatives to filtering software).
349. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens elucidated,
quoting Professor Gregory Laughlin:
"Indeed, one nationwide solution is not needed, as the problems are local and, to some
extent, uniquely so. Libraries in rural communities, for instance, have reported much
less of a problem than libraries in urban areas. A library in a rural community with
only one or two computers with Internet access may find that even the limited filtering
advocated here provides little or no additional benefit. Further, by allowing the
nation's public libraries to develop their own approaches, they may be able to develop
a better understanding of what methods work well and what methods add little or
nothing, or are even counter-productive. Imposing a mandatory nationwide solution
may well impede developing truly effective approaches that do not violate the First
Amendment. The federal and state governments can best assist this effort by providing
libraries with sufficient funding to experiment with a variety of constitutionally
permissible approaches."
Id. at 2315 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Laughlin, supra note 13, at 279). See generally
supra note 248 and accompanying text (describing the district court's treatment of filtering
alternatives).
350. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing to Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001)); see also id. at 2308-09 (plurality opinion). According to
Justice Stevens, the tendency of the filtering software to overblock and underblock distorted that
medium. Id. at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally supra Part II.E (discussing how
Congress's Spending Clause powers are limited when imposing unconstitutional conditions on
the receipt of funding).
353. ALA I, 123 S. Ct. at 2316 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
354. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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use filtering software on Internet-accessible terminals in libraries
receiving certain types of federal funding and consequent denial of
funds to libraries that refuse to comply with that mandate violated the
First Amendment and created an unconstitutional condition on federal
3 55
funds.
Justice Stevens distinguished the case at hand from the Spending
Clause precedent on which the plurality relied. 35 6 First, he argued that
the plurality misinterpreted Rust v. Sullivan because, as explained in
subsequent cases, Rust established a rule for instances in which the
35 7
government attempted to communicate a specific message.
However, under the E-rate and LSTA programs, the government was
not trying to subsidize any particular message. 3 58 Rather, Congress
implemented these programs for the general purpose of giving libraries
resources to provide Internet access to patrons. 359 Further, Justice
355. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In evaluating whether the denial of funds to libraries
constituted an unconstitutional condition, Justice Stevens relied on cases pertaining to
government employment. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that government
employment may not be conditioned on one relinquishing her or his First Amendment rights. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further argued that there is "no distinction between the
penalty of discharge from one's job and the withholding of the benefit of a new job." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
"Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free
exercise of religion as would a fine .... It is too late in the day to doubt that the
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions upon a benefit or privilege."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)).
See
generally supra notes 196-207 and accompanying text (examining Congress's wide latitude
when attaching conditions to federal funding).
356. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally supra notes 29296 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality's reasoning about the applicability of the
Spending Clause).
357. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000) (distinguishing Rust because there was no issue presented
about the government's right to distribute funds to advance a particular message); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) (stating that although the
government generally can decide what activities to fund, the Supreme Court "reaffirmed the
requirement of viewpoint neutrality in the Government's provision of financial benefits by
observing that [t]he case would be different if Congress were to discriminate invidiously in its
subsidies in such a way as to 'ai [m] at the suppression of dangerous ideas"' (alteration in original)
(citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983))); supra note 200 and
accompanying text (discussing interpretations and implications of Rust).
358. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
359. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that if any message does come from
the use of filtering software, it is that "all speech that gets through the software is supported by
the Government." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For discussion of the purposes of the LSTA
programs, see AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, LIBRARY SERVICES AND TECHNOLOGY ACT: BASIC
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, at http://www.ala.org/cfapps/archive.cfm?path=washofflstaqa.html
(last updated Mar. 8, 2001).
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Stevens stated that even though Congress enacted CIPA to restrict
children's access to visual depictions of obscenity, child pornography,
or materials that were harmful to minors, the tendency of the filtering
software to err, through underblocking inappropriate sites and
360
overblocking protected information, nullified this purpose.
Second, Justice Stevens distinguished the case at hand from National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley because the plaintiffs in Finley did not
challenge a statute's constitutionality generally; rather, they challenged
the statute's specific application to them. 36 1 Justice Stevens argued that

Finley would apply here only 362
if patrons challenged the libraries'

decision to use filtering software.
Finally, Justice Stevens addressed the CIPA provisions that required

libraries to install filtering software on all computers in the library if
they received the E-rate or LSTA funding. 36 3 If a library used the Erate or LSTA funding for just one computer, but had ten others, CIPA
364
required that the library equip all eleven computers with filters.
Justice Stevens noted that this eliminated the option of providing
filtered computers in a children's area while simultaneously providing
unfiltered computers in the adult area. 36 5 Therefore, he stated that the

government's

interest

in

protecting

children

from

accessing

360. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2317 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally supra note 207 (describing the Finley
case and its implications).
362. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens distinguished the
case at hand from Finley because in Finley, the NEA decision-making entity retained a large
degree of discretion. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Finley did not involve a challenge by the NEA to a governmental restriction on its
ability to award grants. Instead, the respondents were performance artists who had
applied for NEA grants but were denied funding .... If this were a case in which
library patrons had challenged a library's decision to install and use filtering software,
it would be in the same posture as Finley. Because it is not, Finley does not control
this case.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See generally Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1998) (explaining the claims of the four individual plaintiffs);
supra Part II.E (discussing Spending Clause jurisprudence).
363. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally supra note 222 and
accompanying text (outlining the CIPA requirement that all computers in libraries receiving
LSTA or E-rate discounts be equipped with filtering software).
364. ALA// , 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Kimberly S. Keller,
Comment, From Little Acorns Great Oaks Grow: The Constitutionality of Protecting Minors
from Harmful Internet Material in Public Libraries, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 549, 602-03 (1999)

(discussing the implications of requiring filtering software on all computers, particularly in
libraries that have only one Internet-accessible computer).
365. ALA I, 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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inappropriate materials did not justify this overly broad restriction on
36 6
adults' access to constitutionally protected materials.
5. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter, in a dissenting opinion in which Justice Ginsburg
joined, agreed with Justice Stevens's finding that the CIPA filtering
36 7
requirements were unconstitutional conditions on federal funding.
Further, Justice Souter stated that the filtering conditions constituted an
invalid use of Congress's Spending Clause powers because the filtering
conditions required actions that would have violated the First
Amendment had the libraries chosen to implement them on their
3 68
own.
First, Justice Souter turned to the discussion of disabling the filtering
software. 369 Justice Souter stated that he would not have dissented if he
believed that librarians actually would disable the filters upon the
request of an adult. 370 Justice Souter remained skeptical that libraries
would interpret the statute as permitting their librarians to disable the
filters upon request, even though the Solicitor General clearly stated that
371
librarians would do so.
To further his argument, Justice Souter referenced an FCC regulation
providing that unblocking determinations were to be handled at the
local level.3 7 2 Also, he noted that the statute provided that libraries

366. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 2318 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra text accompanying note 336 (noting
Justice Stevens's argument on this point). Like the other justices, Justice Souter recognized that
there is a compelling government interest in protecting children from inappropriate materials. Id.
at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
368.
ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally supra Part II.E
(discussing Spending Clause jurisprudence).
369. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally supra note 249 and
accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provision).
370. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
371. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that he
realize[d] the Solicitor General represented this to be the Government's policy ... and
if that policy were communicated to every affected library as unequivocally as it was
stated to [the Court] at argument, local librarians might be able to indulge the
unblocking requests of adult patrons to the point of taking the curse off the statute for
all practical purposes.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
372. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). See FCC CIPA Implementation, supra note 222, para. 53,
which states:
Federally-imposed rules directing school and library staff when to disable technology
protection measures would likely be overbroad and imprecise, potentially chilling
speech, or otherwise confusing schools and libraries about the requirements of the
statute. We leave such determinations to the local communities, whom we believe to
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"may," rather than "must," unblock protected material. 373 Moreover, he
stated that the uncertainty of the terms "lawful purpose" and "bona fide
research," coupled with the wide discretion of library staff, compounded
the restrictions on speech. 374 Finally, he noted that unblocking may be
375
unavailable for days, especially in libraries that are understaffed.
Next, Justice Souter turned to the First Amendment issue and stated
that the Court needed to understand that, while CIPA restricted
children's access to a considerable amount of speech that was
considered harmful to children, it also withheld that material from
adults, for whom it was protected, and restricted access to a similarly
large amount of material that was harmful to no one, including
376
children.
Moreover, because less restrictive alternatives to filtering software
existed, Justice Souter stated that the attempt to protect children from
inappropriate materials through the filtering technology did not justify
the restrictions it placed on adult speech. 377 There were numerous
options that could meet the government objective without casting such a
wide net over adults' protected speech.37 8 For example, libraries could
install filters on computers specifically designated for children as well
as having librarians monitor the displays on all of the computer
screens. 379 Alternatively, Justice Souter suggested that CIPA may pass

constitutional muster if it provided for disabling the filters "with no

be most knowledgeable about the varying circumstances of schools or libraries within
those communities.
Id.
373. ALA //,123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); see 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000)
(providing that "[a]n administrator, supervisor, or other authority may disable a technology
protection measure.., to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purposes."); 47
U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000) (providing the requirements under CIPA). See generally supra
note 249 and accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provision).
374. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally supra note 249 and
accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provision).
375. ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted that the plurality also agreed that
this was inevitable when using the existing filtering technology. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 2306 (plurality opinion) (recognizing that filtering technology blocks protected
speech).
377. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally supra note 41 and accompanying text
(outlining the requirement that in order for a restriction to pass strict scrutiny, there may be no
less restrictive alternatives available).
378. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting different computer
terminals for adults and children).
379. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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However, Justice Souter argued that the
questions asked." '380
government's requirement that libraries install filtering technology was
"overkill," as evidenced by its refusal to trust even library staff, whose
despite the fact
computer terminals also must have filtering software,
38 1
that staff computers are not accessible to the public.
Therefore, Justice Souter believed that the appropriate question was
whether a library, of its own accord, would be acting constitutionally if
it were to install and use filtering technology on publicly accessible
computer terminals. 38 2 Justice Souter answered by stating that if a
library chose to use filtering software to block out material "harmful to
minors," the filtering software would constitute a content-based
decision and thus censorship. 383 Although CIPA permits adults to
request that a librarian disable the filters, this does not remedy CIPA's
constitutional problems because some requests do not qualify for the
unblocking. 384 Justice Souter argued that those that did not qualify for
act of
the unblocking provision would be subject to a government
385
censorship, which is prohibited under the First Amendment.
Justice Souter asserted that the plurality did not treat the filtering
software as censorship; rather, the plurality treated the filtering software
380. Id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, Justice Souter also believed that the
embarrassment a child may feel when asking a librarian to unblock a protected sight is not
enough to rule CIPA unconstitutional. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
381. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally FCC CIPA Implementation, supra note
222, para. 30 (stating that CIPA filtering requirements also apply to the librarians' computers).
382. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter reasoned:
The question for me, then, is whether a local library could itself constitutionally
impose ... restrictions on the content otherwise available to an adult patron through an
Internet connection, at a library terminal provided for public use. The answer is no. A
library that chose to block an adult's Internet access to material harmful to children
(and whatever else the undiscriminating filter might interrupt) would be imposing a
content-based restriction on communication of material in the library's control that an
adult could otherwise lawfully see. That would simply be censorship.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). In Butler v. Michigan, there was a fear that by restricting adults'
access to material harmful to minors, states would "reduce the adult population ... to reading
only what is fit for children." Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
384. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). CIPA provides that the filters may be
turned off for "bona fide research or other lawful purpose." 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) (2003); see
also supra note 249 and accompanying text (examining CIPA's disabling provision).
385. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter noted:
"The policy of the First Amendment favors dissemination of information and opinion,
and the guarantees of freedom of speech and press were not designed to prevent the
censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it
might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely
essential."
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975)).
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as it would the means generally exercised by libraries in choosing
materials for their collections. 386 Justice Souter argued that the
plurality's theory was not accurate because, while libraries must be
concerned with monetary limits and shelf space when deciding which
print materials to acquire, Internet materials do not have such
limitations.387 When acquiring access to Internet materials, there is no
concern for expending extra resources or taking up large amounts of
space. 388 Thus, Justice Souter reasoned that the Court should treat
Internet filtering differently than it would libraries' acquisition of print
materials, because with Internet access, libraries have already purchased
the access and filtering consequently389eliminates materials acquired
through the purchase of Internet access.
Justice Souter next disagreed with the plurality's reliance on the
general purpose of libraries, arguing that even the public libraries have
rejected the plurality's statement of libraries' mission. 390 Justice Souter

also reasoned that libraries are not in the practice of restricting adult
access to materials. 39 1 Rather, libraries traditionally have been opposed
to censorship and have given adults access to any of the libraries'
386. Id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2306 (plurality opinion) (arguing
that libraries have no opportunity to filter Internet sites, like they can books and other print
materials).
387. Id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that "[s]electivity is...
necessary and complex" and that when libraries are making these decisions, most courts would
apply a rational basis test. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that this was an
inadequate assessment. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated the proper analysis as
follows:
[D]eciding against buying a book means there is no book (unless a loan can be
obtained), but blocking the Internet is merely blocking access purchased in its entirety
and subject to unblocking if the librarian agrees. The proper analogy therefore is not to
passing up a book that might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then
keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable "purpose," or to buying an encyclopedia
and then cutting out pages with anything thought to be unsuitable for all adults.
Id. at 2321-22 (Souter, J., dissenting).
388. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). CIPA actually requires that libraries expend extra
resources, because they now have to purchase the Internet access as well as filtering software.
See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting) (distinguishing a library's Internet access from general
print collections).
389. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter noted:
Since it makes no difference to the cost of Internet access whether an adult calls up
material harmful for children or the Articles of Confederation, blocking (on facts like
these) is not necessitated by scarcity of either money or space. In the instance of the
Internet, what the library acquires is electronic access, and the choice to block is a
choice to limit access that has already been acquired.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
390. Id. at 2322 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generallysupra notes 262-65 and accompanying
text (reviewing the plurality's understanding of libraries' purposes).
391. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2322 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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holdings (so long as the adult is entitled to use the library). 39 2 Further,
Justice Souter stated that libraries traditionally have not required adults
requesting materials to present an appropriate purpose for their
requests.

39 3

Finally, Justice Souter found that library acquisition decisions were
poor candidates for effective judicial resolution. 3 94 Due to the number
of legitimate considerations taken into account during this decision-

making process, along with the volume of possible legal challenges,
Justice Souter argued that courts generally should avoid these types of
cases. 395 However, in this case, Justice Souter concluded that the Court
should have applied strict scrutiny to CIPA's filtering mandate and that
the filtering mandate violates the First Amendment. 39 6 Further, Justice

392. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated that, toward the beginning and middle of
the twentieth century, there have been some instances in which libraries placed a portion of their
collection apart from the open stacks, which would be available only upon specific requests, but
that he had not been able to find instances of a library "barring access to materials in its collection
on a basis other than a reader's age." Id. at 2323 (Souter, J., dissenting). "It seems to have been
out of the question for a library to refuse a book in its collection to a requesting adult patron, or to
presume to evaluate the basis for a particular request." Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). However, the
American Library Association adopted a statement that stated that it was against restricting
minors' access to library materials. Id. at 2323 (Souter, J., dissenting); AM. LIBRARY ASS'N,
FREE ACCESS TO LIBRARIES FOR MINORS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE LIBRARY BILL OF
RIGHTS (1991), reprinted in PECK, supra note 48, at 166-67. The ALA recognized that libraries
used many means to restrict minors' access to materials, including having separate reading rooms
or collections for adults or issuing library cards that limit access to some materials for adults only.
Id.; AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, supra, reprinted in PECK, supra note 48, at 171-72. The ALA stated
that it opposed the use of these restrictions, asserting further that "only the parent... may restrict
his children-and only his children-from access to library materials and services." ALA If, 123
S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also PECK, supra note 48, at 148-75 (reprinting ALA's
interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights.).
393. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2323 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter based his discussion on
the American Library Association's advocating for full access to materials for adults and minors.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
If such a practice has survived into the latter half of the 20th century, one would surely
find a statement about it from the ALA, which had become the nemesis of anything
sounding like censorship in library holdings. The silence bespeaks an American public
library that gives any adult patron any material at hand, and a history without support
for the plurality's reading of the First Amendment as tolerating a public library's
censorship of its collection against adult enquiry.
Id. at 2323-24 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter discussed how libraries have handled
materials that are protected for adults but not for minors. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). His analysis
considered the means used during the first half and then the latter half of the twentieth century.
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
394. Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
395. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
396. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Souter argued that CIPA's filtering mandate was unconstitutional
397
because its breadth resulted in unconstitutional actions by libraries.
IV.

ANALYSIS

Although the Supreme Court in United States v. American Library
Ass'n held that CIPA was constitutional, the justices failed to reach a
majority opinion. 398 This Part first will argue that the plurality
incorrectly applied a rational basis analysis, based on its finding that
filtering software should be treated similarly to library acquisition
decisions. 39 9 Then, this Part will assert that Justice Souter's finding that
filtering software is more analogous to library removal decisions was
correct and therefore CIPA should have been subjected to strict
scrutiny. 40 0 Finally, this Part argues that CIPA does not withstand strict
scrutiny and the Court should have struck it down, as Justices Souter
and Stevens advocated.40 1
A. Strict Scrutiny, Not Rational Basis, Was the Proper
Level of Scrutiny
All of the justices agreed that there is a compelling government
interest in protecting children from accessing inappropriate materials on
the Internet. 40 2 Their disagreement was whether strict scrutiny applied
4 3
to CIPA, and if so, whether the statute passed this more rigorous test. 0
Justice Souter was correct to apply strict scrutiny to CIPA's filtering
mandates because the filters, by blocking materials based on

397. Id. at 2324-25 (Souter, J., dissenting). "[T]he Act's blocking requirement in its current
breadth calls for unconstitutional action by a library recipient, and is itself unconstitutional." Id.
at 2325 (Souter, J., dissenting).
398. Id. at 2300 (plurality opinion).
399. See infra Part 1V.A.l (examining the Chief Justice's rationale and how it is
distinguishable from precedent).
400. See infra Part IV.A-B (discussing Justice Souter's disagreement with the plurality
opinion and how filtering software works to remove materials from library collections).
401. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2325 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that CIPA's filtering
mandate violated library patrons' First Amendment rights); id. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding CIPA's filtering conditions unconstitutionally overbroad).
402. Id. at 2300 (plurality opinion); id. at 2309 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2310 (Breyer,
J., concurring); id. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
403. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783,
796 (E.D. Va. 1998) (determining that "a public library must satisfy strict scrutiny before it may
engage in content-based regulation of protected speech."). Applying strict scrutiny here is in
agreement with Mainstream Loudoun, which found that the use of Internet filters to block
inappropriate materials constituted a content-based restriction on speech, subjecting it to strict
scrutiny. Id. at 796-97.
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categorizations, constituted content-based restrictions on speech.4 °4
This section begins by addressing the principles relevant in determining
which level of scrutiny should apply and argues that the Court should
have applied strict scrutiny because (1) Internet filters are

distinguishable from library acquisition decisions 405
and (2) Internet
access in public libraries is a designated public forum.
1. Internet Filters Are Distinguishable from Library

Acquisition Decisions
The plurality incorrectly stated that Internet materials available in
public libraries were similar to library print acquisition decisions, which
the Supreme Court has ruled involve the use of discretion. 40 6 Instead,
the plurality should have analyzed the case according to library removal
decisions and applied a strict scrutiny analysis in accordance with
40 7

Pico.

Internet materials must be treated differently from library print
collections because, although library staff review all of their print
materials, library staff cannot feasibly review every website. 40 8 Thus,
Justice Souter correctly determined that Internet filters were

distinguishable from library acquisition decisions because librarians do
404. See ALA 1I, 123 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (Souter, J., dissenting). In his concurring opinion,
Justice Breyer disagreed with the plurality, stating that the Chief Justice's opinion treated the
issue as though there were no First Amendment implications. Id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Justice Breyer correctly identified that the use of filtering software blocks library patrons' right to
receive information and must be treated differently than library acquisition decisions. Id. (Breyer,
J., concurring). However, unlike the dissenters, Justice Breyer did not go so far as to advocate
strict scrutiny; rather, he advocated for a heightened level of scrutiny, which balanced the
government's objectives, proposed restriction, and less restrictive alternatives. Id. at 2311
(Breyer, J., concurring). Using this incorrect test, Justice Breyer came to the conclusion that
filtering software was adequate to meet the government objective and was an inexpensive means
of doing so, thereby stating that the filtering conditions were not disproportionate to the
government interest. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to
CIPA). But see id. at 2319-20 (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that strict scrutiny is the proper
analysis for CIPA). However, Justice Breyer stated that this intermediate level of scrutiny was
meant to supplement strict scrutiny, not replace it. Id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
405. See infra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that the plurality was incorrect in finding that filtering
software is similar to library acquisition decisions because it is more analogous to removal
decisions, which are subject to a heightened level of scrutiny).
406. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864 (1982) (plurality opinion) (explaining that libraries have wide discretion when deciding
which materials to add to their collections, but that their removal decisions are subject to a higher
level of scrutiny).
407. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (plurality opinion). See generally supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text (outlining Pico and its implications).
408. ALA 1!, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion). Not only are thousands of new websites
added daily, but website operators frequently update and modify existing websites. See id. at
2306 (discussing some of the problems encountered by attempts to review Internet materials).
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not review websites and make individualized determinations as 40to9
whether the sites fall into a constitutionally protected category.
Further, Justice Souter correctly reasoned that while a library must use
discretion with print collections because of financial limits or lack of
physical space, a library does not need to use discretion with Internet
materials for those same reasons. 4 10 Instead, when a library purchases
Internet access, it makes the whole of the Internet available to its
patrons.4 11 Then, when filtering software is installed, the software
restricts access to Internet materials based on the software
manufacturer's specifications, not on a librarian's opinion as to what is
appropriate for his or her patrons, or the library's financial limits or lack
of physical space. 4 12 Finally, excluding materials from the Internet is
distinguishable from libraries' historical exclusion of pornographic
materials from their print collections because the exclusion of
pornographic print materials likely involved the librarian reviewing the
materials and using his or her acquisition discretion to not purchase or
4 13
accept those materials.
Consequently, the plurality incorrectly failed to distinguish Internet
filters from library acquisition decisions. 4 14 Instead, the plurality
should have analyzed the case according to library removal decisions, as

409. See id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting). As Justice Souter noted:
[W]hen the library makes a book decision, doesn't it make a decision that says, we will
not put God's Little Acre on our shelves? It's a yes or no decision with respect to the
book. It's quite true there are lots of books out there that the library not-may not
know about, but when it makes a decision not to put it on the shelf, it knows what it's
deciding not to do, and here it doesn't.
Transcript
of Oral
Argument
at
9, ALA
H (No.
02-361),
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argumenttranscripts/02-361.pdf
(last visited
Mar. 17, 2004).
410. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter reasoned that there are
two major reasons why courts should afford libraries discretion concerning acquisition decisions:
first, librarians need to consider such factors as "demand, scholarly or esthetic quality, alternative
purchases, relative cost and so on"; and second, there are so many library acquisition decisions
that the court system would be overloaded should it have to judge the constitutionality of each
decision. Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
411. See id. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter argued that library decisions
regarding print collections cannot be treated the same as blocking Internet access because the
concern for physical resources and money are not present with Internet access. Id. (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
412. Id. at 2324 (Souter, J., dissenting).
413. Id. at 2306 (plurality opinion).
414. Compare id. (plurality opinion) (outlining the plurality's finding that Internet filters
ought to be treated as library acquisition decisions), with id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should not have analyzed CIPA as an acquisition decision).
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in Pico, and subjected CIPA to strict scrutiny. 4 15 The filtering
requirements of CIPA are more similar to a removal decision than a
print acquisition decision because a library purchases the whole of the
4 16
Internet, and the filtering technology selectively excludes materials.
Therefore, strict scrutiny was the appropriate analysis for CIPA.4 17
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer was correct in agreeing with
Chief Justice Rehnquist that libraries must be afforded discretion when
choosing materials for their collections. 4 18 Justice Breyer, however, did
not go so far as to advocate a strict scrutiny analysis. 4 19 Rather, he
argued that even though libraries should be afforded discretion in
making acquisition decisions, they still should be subject to 4an
20
intermediate level of scrutiny, although not strict scrutiny.
Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Breyer's conclusions
that Internet filters are similar to library acquisition decisions were
incorrect because librarians do not review all of the available Internet
42 1
materials.
2.

Public Forum

It is true that the Internet does not enjoy the same historical status
required for traditional public forums. 4 22 However, the plurality
incorrectly stated that the government did not make an affirmative step
to designate Internet access as a public forum. 42 3 The government took
an affirmative step to designate Internet access as a public forum when
it announced that the reason libraries provide Internet access is to give
their patrons another medium for research.4 24 Internet access in public
415. See id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that strict scrutiny was the appropriate
analysis). See generally supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (outlining Pico and its
implications).
416. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text (outlining the different rules for acquisition and removal decisions).
417. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting).
418. See id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
419. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer argued that the application of strict scrutiny to
library selection decisions, regardless of whether the decisions were made by the libraries
themselves or other legitimate community entities, would interfere with the discretion that is
necessary to maintain an appropriate collection of materials. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
420. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
421. See id. at 2306 (plurality opinion) (finding that filtering software should be treated like
library acquisition decisions); id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring) (finding similarly that
appropriate discretion was involved).
422. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing distinctions between different types of public forums).
423. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2305 (plurality opinion); id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(arguing that strict scrutiny was the appropriate analysis).
424. See id. at 2305 (plurality opinion) (outlining the reasons why the government provides
Internet access in libraries).
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libraries is a designated public forum; therefore, the First Amendment
right to receive, and CIPA should have been subject to
does include a 25
4
scrutiny.
strict
B. If Strict Scrutiny Were Applied, CIPA Would Fail
Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens correctly recognized that
filtering software blocks a considerable amount of protected speech,
which directly affects library patrons' First Amendment rights to

receive information. 426

Additionally, all of the justices' opinions

acknowledged that filtering technology, mandated by CIPA, was
flawed. 4 27 However, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Breyer
incorrectly found that the existing filtering technology was an adequate

response

to protecting

against

Internet pornography. 428

First

Amendment jurisprudence requires that government-imposed, content-

based restrictions, especially in designated public forums, be subject to
strict scrutiny.4 29 Justice Souter used the appropriate level of scrutiny
430
and consequently found that CIPA would not pass this review.
Therefore, this section argues that when strict scrutiny is applied to
CIPA, it becomes clear that the provisions are not narrowly tailored to
the compelling government interest, thereby rendering CIPA's filtering
mandate unconstitutional.4 3 1

425. See id. at 2320-21 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because CIPA constituted a
content-based restriction on speech in a public forum, strict scrutiny was the appropriate
standard).
426. See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
427. Id. at 2306 (plurality opinion); id. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2312 (Breyer,
J., concurring); id. at 2313-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting); see
United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000) (holding that unless the
filtering technology is perfect, the issues were not reconciled with the First Amendment); ALA I,
201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 481 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that "[u]nless software filters are themselves
perfectly effective," the government cannot argue that the alternatives are imperfect).
428. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (Rehnquist, C. J., plurality opinion) (arguing that although
the filtering software is flawed, it will suffice to meet the government's interest); id. at 2312
(Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding, through the application of an intermediate level of scrutiny,
that filtering software is inexpensive and fairly effective, and that there was no evidence of a
better alternative).
429. See supra Part II.A.1 (laying out the general requirement that content-based restrictions
must withstand strict scrutiny to remain active).
430. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text (outlining the requirements for passing strict scrutiny).
431. See infra Part IV.B. 1-3 (reasoning that, when strict scrutiny is applied, filtering software
is not narrowly tailored to the government's interest in protecting children from inappropriate
material).
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1. Existing Filtering Technology Is Not Good Enough
A restriction on speech will survive strict scrutiny if the government
can show that the regulation is related to a compelling government
4 32
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest.
All of the justices agreed that there is a compelling government interest
in protecting children from viewing inappropriate materials on the
Internet. 4 33 CIPA's provisions, however, are not narrowly tailored to
434
serve that interest.
Filtering software blocks a vast amount of material that the First
Amendment protects for adults, as well as a significant amount of
material that is protected for both adults and children. 435 Whereas Chief
Justice Rehnquist conceded that filtering software did indeed restrict
access to constitutionally protected materials, he incorrectly stated that
the filtering software was sufficient. 436 There are two main ways in
which filtering software poses First Amendment problems: first,
filtering software only recognizes text, not visual depictions, which
results in underblocking the materials CIPA was meant to protect
against; and second, filtering software overblocks constitutionally
protected materials. 437 Hence, even though Congress designed CIPA's
conditions to protect against children accessing inappropriate materials,
the conditions are not adequate to meet its purpose because filtering
software does not sufficiently recognize and block the materials CIPA
4 38
was meant to protect against.
Justices Souter and Stevens further reasoned that CIPA's filtering
mandates extended too far because the statute requires that even the
librarians' computers must be equipped with Internet filters. 439 Finally,
432. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813; Sable Communications of Cal. Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126

(1989).
433. ALA 1!, 123 S. Ct. at 2301-02 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 2309 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2314 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2319
(Souter, J., dissenting).
434. See id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting) (finding that CIPA failed strict scrutiny); see also
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements for passing strict scrutiny).
435. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting studies that have shown that filters
often over- and underblock information).
436. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
437. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Laughlin, supra note 13, at 262 (stating that textbased filters are distinguishable from library collection decisions because they automatically
block out materials, requiring no effort or decision-making by librarians); see also supra note 140
and accompanying text (noting studies that have shown the inadequacies of filtering software).
438. See supra notes 129-37 and accompanying text (describing how Internet filters recognize
what materials to block).
439. ALA //, 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(stating that this provision constituted "overkill").
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the existing filtering technology
fails strict scrutiny because less
440
restrictive alternatives exist.
2. Alternatives to Filtering Would Suffice
Because the existing filtering technology was not narrowly tailored,
Justices Stevens and Souter correctly advocated for some alternatives to
installing filtering software. 44 1 Each of these alternatives provide less
restriction on speech because libraries can tailor them to the particular

needs of their communities, taking spatial arrangements, Internet
demand, and financial resources into consideration. 4 42 Moreover, these
alternatives do not require libraries to spend extra money for the
filtering software mandated by CIPA or extra time training staff on how
to use the software, thus lessening the financial strain on libraries that
already have expressed an economic need by applying for federal
44 3
subsidies.
For instance, commentators have suggested having separate banks of
computers with filtering software for children and unrestricted
computers for adult use. 444 However, as both Justices Stevens and
Souter correctly noted, this alternative would fail under CIPA, since
CIPA requires that if a library receives LSTA or E-rate funding, all of
the library's computers must use filtering software. 44 5 Libraries also
may place unrestricted computer terminals in areas that are set aside
440. Id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting).
441. See id. at 2313-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). See
generally supra Part II.D.2 (discussing alternatives to filtering software).
442. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2313 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing as one of CIPA's flaws that it
created a nationwide solution to a problem that should be left to localities to decide); see also
NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS (Aug.

2003)

(outlining numerous "successful best practices," many of which could be implemented
simultaneously for a more effective response), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/
ntiagenera/cipa2003/CIPAreport_08142003.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
443. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2321 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing some financial
concerns in regards to CIPA).
444. Id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). Some alternatives recommended by commentators
include the use of privacy monitors or recessed screens or the implementation of an Internet use
policy. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d. 552,
565 (E.D. Va. 1998) (referencing an incident in which a Virginia library offered unrestricted
Internet access but used privacy screens and thus addressed the problem of patrons accessing
inappropriate materials); Goldstein, supra note 10, at 182 (proposing various alternatives to
filtering software); see also COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12 (reviewing
different proposals for regulating children's access to the Internet); supra note 143 and
accompanying text (discussing Internet use policies and proposed guidelines for the
implementation thereof); supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text (discussing the placement
of computers in infrequently used or easily monitored areas as alternatives to filters).
445. See ALA 1I, 123 S. Ct. at 2318 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2320 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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from the library's main children's area. 44 6 Additionally, libraries may
choose to place computer terminals in areas easily monitored by
librarians. 44 7 Also, librarians may tap patrons on their shoulders and
request that the patrons go to different websites or discontinue their
Internet sessions. 44 8 As Justice Souter insightfully noted, librarians will
have to use this method of controlling Internet access to inappropriate
materials even if they have the filtering software installed because the
filtering software underblocks a significant amount of pornographic
material. 44 9
4 50
Finally, libraries could require some type of parental involvement.
This could entail educating parents and their children about the Internet,
requiring parental consent for children to use unfiltered computers,
asking parents to designate a filtering level when a child applies for a
451
library card, or mandating parental supervision.
All of these alternatives are less restrictive to speech than the existing
filtering software; therefore, the filtering technology of CIPA does not
withstand strict scrutiny, and Justices Stevens and Souter correctly
4 52
advocated the use of these alternatives.

446. Id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that
physically moving computers away from high-traffic areas can be used as a way to eliminate
inadvertent exposure).
447. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); supra note 147 and accompanying text
(stating that the physical placement of the computers in easily-monitored areas could be used as
an alternative to filters).
448. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing the
"tap-on-the-shoulder" method and its qualities and limitations).
449. ALA If, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra Part II.D.2 (examining
alternatives to filtering software).
450. ALA If, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Rodden, supra note 153, at 215661 (discussing whether CIPA infringes on parents' right to control what information their
children receive). See generally supra Part ILD.2 (discussing alternatives to filtering software,
including those methods involving parental involvement).
451. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Rodden, supra note 153, at 2161
("CIPA's opponents may argue that deferring to parental regulation avoids broader constitutional
problems, such as First Amendment concerns, that arise when the federal government attempts to
regulate speech."); see also Witte, supra note 12, at 779 (arguing that Internet filters may be
appropriate when used by parents to tailor their children's restricted access to the Internet). If
parents are allowed to choose the level of access for their children, the parents can tailor the
filtering software to the specific concerns for that child. Id. at 779. See generally supra Part
II.D.2 (discussing various methods libraries may employ in lieu of filtering software).
452. See supra Part II.D.2 (outlining the numerous alternatives to filtering software and how
libraries may tailor their responses to their particular needs); cf ALA H, 123 S. Ct at 2313
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the belief that CIPA created a "blunt" national standard).
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3. CIPA's Disabling Provisions Do Not Save the Statute
Justice Souter correctly stated that CIPA's disabling provisions did
not render CIPA narrowly tailored to the compelling government
interest of protecting children from harmful Internet material.4 5 3
Instead, Justice Souter properly reasoned that the disabling provisions
do not remedy CIPA's constitutional problems because the ability of a
librarian to disable the filtering software or unblock a specific website,
as a practical matter, may be nonexistent or severely hindered in some
4 54
areas for several reasons.
First, CIPA leaves the decision to unblock a website to the local
librarian, who must review the website to determine if it comports with
CIPA's guidelines. 4 55 Second, CIPA includes a restrictive guideline for
making this decision: the patron's request to unblock websites must 4be
56
for "bona fide" research activities or any other lawful purpose.
Justice Souter properly feared that there may be inconsistencies in
determining which websites are accessible under CIPA because
unblocking determinations are handled on the local level. 45 7 Moreover,
the exact language of the statute, which states that librarians "may," not
"must," disable the filters or unblock websites upon a patron's request,
45 8
compounds this issue.
453. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
454. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also supra note 249 and accompanying text (examining
some practical concerns, such as patron embarrassment or delay, surrounding CIPA's disabling
provisions). One commentator argued that CIPA's disabling provision, which only allowed
librarians to disable the filters for "bona fide research or other lawful purpose" was not precise.
Conn, supra note 213, at 491-92. This commentator argued that the CIPA disabling provision
"does not specify for what or for whose use the technology protection measures may be disabled,
Id. at 492. See generally supra notes 223-25 and
i.e., students, minors, or adults."
accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provisions); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191,
196 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding that a state school's requirement that faculty request access to
sexually explicit material on the school's computers was constitutional), affd on reh'g, 216 F.3d
401 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 759 (2001).
455. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) (2000); see also supra notes
223-25 and accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provisions).
456. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D). For example, if an adult were to ask a librarian to disable the
filtering software so that he may access a website that includes pornographic materials, which the
First Amendment protects for adults, arguably this would qualify under the lawful purpose
provision. See ALA 1I, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting) (providing a textual analysis of
CIPA's disabling provision); supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (describing CIPA's
disabling provisions).
457. See ALA I, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also FCC CIPA
Implementation, supra note 222, para. 30 (ruling that determinations as to whether CIPA's
disabling provisions apply are left up to local communities).
458. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(0(3); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D); see ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (stating that the language of the statute "must impose some limitation eligibility for
unblocking" and that library staffs decide "who gets complete Internet access and who does not");
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Also, Justice Souter correctly stated that CIPA's disabling provisions
did not render CIPA constitutional because libraries may not have the
459
opportunity to screen the requested websites in a timely manner.
When a patron asks the librarian to unblock a particular website, the
librarian first must review the website to determine whether it is
appropriate under CIPA. 4 60 Then, if the librarian determines that the
website is appropriate, the librarian can disable the filters.4 6 1 However,
this process may take a long time, possibly posing problems in libraries
that are understaffed.4 62 Although the plurality argued that CIPA's
disabling provision was adequate to pass constitutional muster, the
reality is that many library patrons will have neither the time to wait for
the librarians to review and unblock websites nor the desire to make the
initial request because of fear of embarrassment. 46 3 Considering that
the purpose of LSTA and E-rate funding is to assist libraries in reaching

out to underserved or rural communities, it is likely that this problem
4 64
will continue to develop.

id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring) (leaving open the possibility that local communities may
choose to implement "library rules or practices [that] could further restrict the ability of patrons to
obtain 'overblocked' Internet material"); supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing
the allowances provided for in CIPA's disabling provisions).
459. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that the fact
that CIPA required patrons to make the initial request for disabling did not cause a substantial
burden on library patrons. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring). Further, Justice Breyer argued
that this step was similar to library patrons having to make specific requests for materials from
closed stacks or through interlibrary loans. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
460. Id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting). The government has left determinations as to whether
the librarian should disable the filters to the particular libraries, which the FCC "believ[ed] to be
most knowledgeable about the varying circumstances of schools or libraries within those
communities." FCC CIPA Implementation, supra note 222, para. 53.
461. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting); see supra notes 223-25 and
accompanying text (discussing CIPA provisions that allow librarians to disable the filtering
software in certain circumstances). Justice Souter noted that the terms "bona fide research" and
"lawful purposes" would cause uncertainty. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting);
see also Conn, supra note 213, at 492 (arguing that CIPA's disabling provision needs
clarification).
462. ALA /, 123 S. Ct. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting).
463. See id. at 2307 (plurality opinion) (finding that the filters were an adequate answer to the
government's interest); ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 486-87 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (arguing that
requiring patrons to identify themselves before being granted access to speech is
unconstitutional); supra note 249 and accompanying text (describing problems such as lengthy
waits and embarrassment on the part of patrons who request that librarians disable the filtering
software).
464. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87. One of the purposes of the LSTA is "to stimulate
excellence and promote access to learning and information resources in all types of libraries for

individuals of all ages." AM. LIBRARY ASS'N,
TECHNOLOGY ACT (LSTA) PART OF THE MUSEUM

SUPPORT THE LIBRARY SERVICES AND
AND LIBRARIES SERVICES ACT 3 (n.d.),

available at http://www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/federallibprog/lsta/lstatalkpoints.pdf
visited Mar. 17, 2004).

(last
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Finally, Justices Souter and Stevens correctly noted that the disabling
provisions do not remedy CIPA's constitutional problems because
patrons may not know the content of the materials that have been
blocked and, therefore, may not understand that they have the right to
request access through a disabling of the filters. 46 5 If one were to type
in a specific URL that was blocked, the patron would be able to request
access specifically to that URL. 4 6 6 However, if one is surfing casually
through various materials, he or she may not know what has been
blocked and whether it is worth time and effort to request
unblocking. 4 67 Therefore, CIPA's disabling provision does not save the
statute because there are practical problems with its implementation,
46 8
including patron embarrassment and delays in disabling.
V. IMPACT

This Part will begin with a discussion of CIPA's immediate impact of
preventing library patrons from accessing constitutionally protected
materials. 4 69 This Part then will address libraries' continuing need, due
to the flaws of filtering technology, to use other means to protect against
patrons accessing inappropriate materials. 470 Next, this Part will
discuss how the Supreme Court's holding that CIPA was constitutional
removes an incentive for software companies to improve their products
47 1
because these companies now have a guaranteed customer base.
Finally, this Part will discuss the possibility of an "as-applied"
challenge to CIPA and how it would lessen the impact of the Court's
holding that CIPA was facially constitutional.4 7 2

465. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2319 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). See generally supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (discussing CIPA's
disabling provisions).
466. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Until a blocked site or group of
sites is unblocked, a patron is unlikely to know what is being hidden and therefore whether there
is any point in asking for the filter to be removed.").
467. Id. at 2319 (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting that requesting websites be unblocked

may not be easy).
468. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
469. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the immediate impact of CIPA is the denial of access to
constitutionally protected speech in libraries).
470. See infra Part V.B (arguing that, because existing filtering technology does not
adequately block inappropriate materials, librarians will have to continue monitoring patrons'
Internet access).
471. See infra Part V.C (arguing that by holding CIPA constitutional, the Supreme Court

guaranteed a customer-base for software manufacturers).
472. See infra Part V.D (agreeing with Justice Kennedy's analysis that although CIPA
withstood a facial invalidation claim, there still may be room for an "as-applied" challenge).
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A. CIPA Restricts Library Patrons'Access to Constitutionally
ProtectedMaterials
The most immediate effect of the Supreme Court's decision holding
CIPA constitutional is that library patrons will be unable to view
materials that they have a constitutional right to access. 473 Without
modifications, the existing filtering technology will continue to block
access to vital material. 4 74 For instance, the filters frequently block
information related to health or sexuality, making it difficult for library

patrons to conduct research on breast cancer, birth control, and gay and
4 75

lesbian issues.
Although the plurality argued that the First Amendment does not
guarantee the right to receive information without embarrassment, the
purpose of libraries is to provide materials that the library believes are
appropriate for their communities. 476 Filtering software does not give
libraries the opportunity to make the decision as to what is appropriate;
rather, filtering software makes this decision. 4 77 Ultimately, filtering
software will deny library patrons access to information that they have a
right to receive under the First Amendment, which will impede the
libraries' purpose of providing relevant and appropriate materials for
4 78
their communities.
473. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2306 (plurality opinion) (conceding that the filtering software
was flawed); id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring) (recognizing that although the existing filtering
software was flawed, there was no evidence of a better alternative); id. at 2313-14 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (finding that filtering software, because of the overblocking of protected websites,
was overbroad); id. at 2320 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that an understanding of CIPA
requires the acknowledgement that "adults will be denied access to a substantial amount of
nonobscene material harmful to children but lawful for adult examination, and a substantial
quantity of text and pictures harmful to no one"); see also infra Part II.B (examining the First
Amendment's right to receive information).
474. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing studies that have attempted to
determine the effectiveness of filtering software). All of these studies concluded that a significant
amount of constitutionally protected material was erroneously blocked by the technology. See id.
475. See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 415-16 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (describing the content from the
websites of one group of plaintiffs, which included information on sexual health, anatomy,
reproductive rights, and gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered issues).
476. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2307 (plurality opinion); see AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, supra note 263
(outlining appropriate purposes for library collection decisions).
477. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) (differentiating between the
standards for library acquisition decisions, and the discretions afforded them, and library removal
decisions, which must comply with the First Amendment); supra Part I.D.l (discussing how
filtering technology works and its limitations).
478. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2303-04 (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Rehnquist based
much of the plurality opinion on the role libraries play in communities and the fact that they
provide a forum for the receipt of information. Id. (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 26266 and accompanying text (explaining the plurality's opinion concerning the purpose of libraries).
However, Justice Souter stated that "the plurality's conception of a public library's mission has

2004]

Internet Filters and the First Amendment
B. Libraries Will Still Have To Use the Alternatives to
FilteringSoftware

The Supreme Court found that CIPA's mandate, requiring public
libraries receiving certain federal funding to implement filtering
software, did not violate the First Amendment. 479 However, in reality,
the filtering software overblocks constitutionally protected materials
while underblocking the materials that the software was meant to
block.4 80 For instance, Internet filters do not screen e-mails, chat
sessions, and other Internet-based programs for inappropriate
materials. 48 1 Moreover, because the existing filtering technology is
primarily text-based, the technology is unable to recognize visual
depictions that constitute obscenity, child pornography, or materials that
are "harmful to minors." 4 82 Therefore, because the filtering technology
continues to allow patrons access to unprotected materials, librarians
will have to use other means to restrict patrons from accessing
inappropriate materials. 4 83 Only with software alternatives, such as the
"tap-on-the-shoulder" method and the implementation of an Internet use
policy, can libraries truly achieve Congress's goal of prohibiting access
to obscenity, child pornography, and other materials deemed to be
4 84
"harmful to minors."
C. FilteringSoftware Companies May Sustain the Status Quo
Software designers use methods that lead to the overblocking of a
significant number of constitutionally protected websites and the

been rejected by the libraries themselves." See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. at 2322 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter added that "no library that chose to block adult access in the way mandated by
[CIPA] could claim that the history of public library practice in this country furnished an implicit
gloss on First Amendment standards, allowing for blocking out anything unsuitable for adults."
Id. (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2322-23 (Souter, J., dissenting) (examining the history
of censorship since the middle of the nineteenth century).
479. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (plurality opinion) (finding that CIPA was constitutional).
480. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing studies on filtering software that
found that the technology significantly overblocked protected speech and underblocked materials
they were designed to thwart).
481. HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 2.5; see supra Part II.D.I (examining filtering
technology and its limitations).
482. ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 431-32 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Balkin et al., supra note 132, at 10;
HOCHHEISER, supra note 125, § 2.5; supra Part IL.D.I (describing filtering technology and its
limitations).
483. See supra Part II.D.2 (discussing alternatives to filtering software, which allow libraries
to tailor their responses to their particular needs).
484. See supra Part II.D.2 (outlining the methods libraries can use to cope with children
accessing inappropriate online materials).
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underblocking of materials CIPA was meant to block.4 85 Now that the
Supreme Court has endorsed the use of filtering software that restricts
protected speech, software companies have lost one incentive for
48 6
improving their software programs.
Because public libraries receiving LSTA funds or E-rate discounts

now must purchase filtering software, the software manufacturers have
a built-in customer base.4 87 Without incentives for improving their
methods of blocking materials, software manufacturers may uphold the
status quo rather than actively try to reduce the number of underblocked
and overblocked websites. 4 88 Hopefully, the significant private demand
for the filtering software and the large number of filtering software
designers will lead to enough competition to encourage these companies
4 89
to continue to improve their products.
D. FacialInvalidation Leaves Room for an "As-applied" Challenge
In United States v. American Library Ass'n, the Court rejected the
challenge to the facial validity of CIPA. 490 However, as Justice

Kennedy argued, the Court's decision left open room for an "asapplied" challenge, which may exist if, for example, a patron's request
that the librarian disable the filters was denied or extensively
delayed.4 9 1 Thus, the impact of this case is limited because there is still
the possibility that a particular plaintiff may bring suit to challenge
CIPA's constitutionality. 49 2 For example, if a library patron tries to
485. See ALA II, 123 S. Ct. 2297, 2308 (2003) (plurality opinion) (upholding CIPA's
constitutionality).
486. See id. (finding that CIPA was constitutionally sound). Because CIPA was held to be
valid, thousands of libraries across the nation must purchase Internet filtering software.
487. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(l)(B) (2003) (requiring libraries receiving E-rate discounts to
install filtering software);
see also AM.
LIBRARY ASS'N,
THE E-RATE,
at
http://www.ala.org/ala/pio/factsheets/erate.htm (last revised Jan. 18, 2004) (stating that, at the
initiation of E-rate discounts, more than 30,000 schools and libraries "completed the application
process, secured local and state level approval, and committed other financial resources for
ineligible hardware, software, training, and the non-discounted portion of discounted services").
488. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing studies that have documented
filtering software failures).
489. See COMM'N ON ONLINE CHILD PROT., supra note 12, at 13 (discussing the use of
filtering software in many arenas, including private homes); see also TIFAP, supra note 127
(summarizing the methods of seventeen different types of filtering software in existence as of
1999).
490. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2308 (plurality opinion). See generally supra note 236 (describing
"as-applied" versus facial invalidation challenges to statutes).
491. ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 223-25
and accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provisions).
492. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court left room
for an "as-applied" challenge).
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access protected speech through a library's Internet access and is denied
access by the filtering software, and the library subsequently fails to
disable the filters after being requested to do so, that patron still may
have a valid claim against CIPA.4 9 3 Therefore, although CIPA survived
a facial invalidation challenge, it still may be vulnerable to attacks by
individuals whose First Amendment rights have been directly affected
4 94
by the filtering condition or disabling provisions.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision to hold CIPA constitutional
undoubtedly will affect the ways in which individuals use their local
libraries. More importantly, filtering software only provides a false
sense of security because the filters still allow a large amount of
prohibited material through the software. In addition, even though
libraries must spend extra resources to purchase ineffective Internet
filtering software, librarians still will have to use some of the
alternatives suggested to achieve CIPA's compelling goal.

If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock specific Web sites or to disable
the filter or if it is shown that an adult user's election to view constitutionally protected
material is burdened in some other substantial way, that would be the subject for an asapplied challenge, not the facial challenge made in this case.
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra note 236 (describing the difference between facial
invalidation and "as-applied" challenges). Additionally, Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
alluded to the possibility of the Court ruling a different way under Spending Clause precedent.
See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 1218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality misapplied
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley because Finley involved four plaintiffs who had been
harmed directly by the government's regulations, while with CIPA, a directly harmed plaintiff
had yet to bring a constitutional challenge).
493. ALA H, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see supra notes 223-25 and
accompanying text (discussing CIPA's disabling provisions).
494. See ALA 11, 123 S. Ct. at 2310 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

